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ARTICLE

EVICTION COURTS
KATHRYN A. SABBETH*

This Article examines the legal mechanics of the courts that issue eviction orders. It analyzes these courts in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the federal eviction moratoria. The eviction phenomenon
preceded the pandemic, but the pandemic exaggerated many of its features.
How the eviction courts responded to the eviction moratoria reveals a great
deal about how these fora have been functioning all along. While the eviction moratoria were important, the design of eviction courts limited their
impact.
The Article identifies ten groups of laws that structure critical design
features of eviction courts: (1) filing fee statutes that make it cheaper to
pursue eviction than other forms of civil relief; (2) substandard method of
service rules; (3) default rules that allow cases to be decided against tenants
in their absence; (4) short turnaround times between complaint filing and
trial; (5) limits on discovery procedures that might uncover evidence in support of tenants or create delay; (6) jurisdictional limits on the defenses and
counterclaims tenants may raise; (7) rent bond requirements that prevent
tenants from raising defenses unless they pay rent allegedly due; (8) laws
structuring the provision of legal services so that pro se tenants and represented landlords are the norm; (9) laws establishing qualifications of adjudicators so they may operate without legal training; and (10) obstacles to
appeals.
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. As 3Ls in the UNC Civil
Legal Assistance Clinic, Shi Chen and Robert DiDomenico briefed and argued a successful motion to dismiss an eviction proceeding on the basis that the CDC’s eviction moratorium applied to
lease non-renewal cases, not only to nonpayments; preparing with them significantly sharpened
my thinking on the subject. I also benefitted from the opportunity to share the ideas in this Article
with the wonderful participants in the symposium at the University of St. Thomas, and I am
grateful to the law journal editors, both for inviting me to join the interdisciplinary discussion of
American Contagions and for their careful editorial work on this piece. I also appreciate the feedback on this Article provided by Kate Elengold, Jesse McCoy, Erika K. Wilson, and the participants in the Duke-UNC Clinic Scholarship Workshop, as well as the diligent and thoughtful
research assistance of Katie DeAngelis, Catherine Goodman, Joel Green, and Hannah Marion.
Finally, I wish to thank my clients, whom I have not named so as to protect their confidentiality,
but from whom I have learned the most.

359

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\18-2\UST206.txt

360

unknown

Seq: 2

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

22-JUL-22

13:51

[Vol. 18:2

The Article concludes that eviction court operations reflect a legal architecture designed not to recognize tenants’ rights, and instead this legal
architecture supports hierarchical relations between owners and tenants.
While the urgency of the eviction crisis may appear recent, the U.S. has a
long history of depriving subordinated people of homes while others profit
from the scarcity and instability of housing. The design features of eviction
courts serve to maintain this social order.
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INTRODUCTION
The public health crisis and economic fall-out of COVID-19 heightened awareness of an eviction problem that predated the virus but threatens
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to expand exponentially because of it.1 In the years leading up to the pandemic, alarm bells had already been ringing regarding the size and impact
of the eviction phenomenon, particularly after sociologist Matthew
Desmond grabbed national attention with his best-seller, Evicted: Poverty
and Profit in the American City.2 Popular media and social scientists have
documented the harms that eviction imposes on families and communities.3
Commentators have debated which market conditions produce evictions
and which policy changes could mitigate the damage.4 Yet remarkably little
legal scholarship has developed,5 which is somewhat surprising, given that
eviction is a legal process, and, indeed, one that occupies a significant percentage of court dockets.6 This Article seeks to contribute to the development of legal literature on the eviction process.
Inspired by the interdisciplinary symposium on American Contagions,7
this Article marries the social science literature on the social causes and
consequences of eviction with examination of the legal mechanics of the
courts that issue eviction orders. How the eviction courts operate during a
pandemic—and specifically how these legal structures respond or fail to
respond during this extraordinary time—reveals a great deal about our soci1. See, e.g., LastWeekTonight, Coronavirus IX: Evictions: Last Week Tonight with John
Oliver (HBO), YOUTUBE (June 29, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R652nwUcJRA;
Lisa Edwards, Jared Trujillo & Jason Wu, Why Fixing The Housing Crisis Is A Black Lives Matter
Issue, REFINERY29 (June 20, 2020, 11:01 AM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2020/06/
9890811/housing-crisis-eviction-black-lives-matter.
2. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2016).
3. See infra notes 31–47 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 48–55 and accompanying text.
5. Nicole Summers, Civil Probation, 75 STAN. L. REV. _ (forthcoming), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3897493 (manuscript at 9) [hereinafter Civil Probation]
(“[E]viction courts, procedures, and jurisprudence are rarely the focus of legal scholarship.”). A
small literature has discussed the right to counsel and experiences of pro se tenants, see, e.g., Paris
Baldacci, Assuring Access to Justice: The Role of Judges in Assisting Pro Se Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in New York City’s Housing Court, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 659,
696–97 (2006); Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon, 41 HARV. J. L. &
GENDER 55, 60–61 n.30 (2018) (collecting literature), and a handful of law review articles have
presented empirical research on the operation of eviction courts. See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 535 (1992); Nicole Summers, The Limits of Good Law: A Study of Housing
Court Outcomes, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 145, 149 (2020) [hereinafter Good Law]; Lauren Sudeall &
Daniel Pasciutti, Praxis and Paradox: Inside the Black Box of Eviction Court, 73 VAND. L. REV.
1365, 1368 (2021); cf. Megan Hatch, Statutory Protection for Renters Classification of State
Landlord-Tenant Policy Approaches, 27 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 98 (2016) (policy analysis of landlord-tenant laws). But, outside of arguments specific to public housing, see, e.g., Gerald Dickinson, Towards a New Eviction Jurisprudence, 23 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 9–10 (2015),
very few legal scholars have addressed the doctrine of eviction. Cf. Mary Spector, Tenants’
Rights, Procedural Wrongs: The Summary Eviction and the Need for Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV.
135 (2000).
6. See Paula Hannaford-Agor, Scott Graves & Shelley Spacek Miller, The Landscape of
Civil Litigation in State Courts, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., 17–19 (2015), https://www.ncsc.org/
__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/13376/civiljusticereport-2015.pdf.
7. JOHN FABIAN WITT, AMERICAN CONTAGIONS (2020).
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ety’s core commitments and priorities. The Article examines the eviction
courts’ functioning during the pandemic as a window into how they have
been functioning all along. By interpreting the mechanics of eviction courts
against the backdrop of COVID-19, we can see in sharp relief the social
functions that these courts are designed to serve.
Part I situates eviction as a socio-legal phenomenon. It touches on the
market conditions that make housing a scarce commodity and notes the gap
between the cost of housing and income streams available to cover it.8 Law
sets the terms of the marketplace,9 however, and this Part emphasizes the
causes of eviction that can be found in the law.10 These causes include laws
of property and contracts that define tenants, owners, and the rights of each;
laws of investment trusts that encourage the commodification of housing;
and labor laws and public benefits laws that shape family earnings.11 Embedded within and overlapping these are the many laws that have authorized the historical and present-day theft of labor and land from people of
color, while promoting white ownership and wealth.12 In addition to the
laws defining substantive rights, procedural laws determine how disputes
over such rights will be resolved.13 Doctrine determines the process by
which courts adjudicate conflicts between tenants and owners, and doctrine
provides a mechanism for eviction.14 By reviewing together market conditions and laws that result in eviction, Part I shows that eviction is the product of the legal system that political leaders have chosen to construct.
Part I concludes by introducing eviction’s intersection with the pandemic. It suggests that the pandemic exacerbated the inequality wrought by
eviction in at least three ways. First, the pandemic increased the number of
people who face eviction and therefore get trapped in its collateral consequences, which results in the entrenchment of poverty and racial segregation.15 Second, the race and gender inequities of the pandemic likely
multiplied the raced and gendered aspects of eviction.16 Third, COVID-19
made the stakes of eviction even higher. Eviction already posed a significant public health threat, but the pandemic made the dangers even more
acute.17
Part II explores the operations of eviction courts during the pandemic.
It briefly describes the governmental responses to the pandemic and to the
threatened tsunami of evictions, namely rent subsidies and a series of evic8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra Part I.A.
WITT, supra note 7, at 129.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.C.
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tion moratoria. It reviews the federal eviction moratoria contained in the
CARES Act of 2020 and the September 4, 2020 Order of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, the latter of which was extended but ultimately struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court.18 Although the moratoria
did successfully prevent many evictions,19 a large number continued as if
no federal law was in place.20 Part II argues that close examination of eviction court procedures helps to explain the courts’ failure reliably to implement the eviction moratoria.
The Article identifies ten significant aspects of eviction courts’ design:
(1) filing fee statutes that make it cheaper to pursue eviction than other
forms of civil relief; (2) substandard method of service rules; (3) default
rules that allow cases to be decided against tenants in their absence; (4)
short turnaround times between complaint filing and trial; (5) limits on discovery procedures; (6) jurisdictional limits on the defenses and counterclaims tenants may raise; (7) rent bond requirements that prevent tenants
from raising defenses unless they pay rent allegedly due; (8) laws structuring the provision of legal services so that pro se tenants and represented
landlords are the norm; (9) laws establishing qualifications of adjudicators
so they may operate without legal training; and (10) obstacles to appeals.21
Part II argues that these design features made eviction courts an inhospitable environment for the federal moratoria. These features are the products
of law, and yet, because of them, the forum is not equipped for faithful
application of law, let alone careful interpretation of tenants’ rights.
The third and final part of the Article tackles the question of what
social functions eviction courts serve. In general, these courts respond to
disputes between tenants and owners regarding control over real property.
The courts decide who should get access to housing and who should be
excluded from it. Yet, building on theoretical work of Alexandra Natapoff
and Shaun Ossei-Owusu in the criminal context,22 Part III.A asks whether
eviction courts serve legitimate purposes of ascertaining facts and interpret18. See infra Part II.B.
19. Jasmine Rangel, Jacob Haas, Emily Lemmerman, Joe Fish & Peter Hepburn, Preliminary
Analysis: 11 Months of the CDC Moratorium, EVICTION LAB (Aug. 21, 2021), https://eviction
lab.org/eleven-months-cdc.
20. See, e.g., Brittany P. Battle, Speech at Wake Forest University: There Was No Moratorium Here (Sep. 16, 2021); Carly Stern & Mollie Bryant, How Landlords Dodge COVID-19 Eviction Bans Across the U.S., SUN HERALD (May 9, 2021), https://www.sunherald.com/news/
coronavirus/article251249264.html; Chris Arnold, Despite a New Federal Ban, Many Renters Are
Still Getting Evicted, NPR (Sept. 14, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/14/
911939055/despite-a-new-federal-ban-many-renters-are-still-getting-evicted [https://perma.cc/BX
4K-49UM] (“Legal aid attorneys in Houston also say it’s still too often business as usual at eviction hearings. The judges aren’t asking landlords if tenants sent them CDC declarations. Many
tenants . . . don’t appear to even know about their rights under the CDC order. The judges don’t
ask them about that.”).
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Kangaroo Courts, 34 HARV. L. REV. F. 200, 200 (2021) (reviewing
Alexandra Natapoff, Criminal Municipal Courts, 134 HARV. L. REV. 964 (2021)).
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ing law, or, instead, if these fora can fairly be understood as kangaroo
courts that produce particular outcomes.
To better understand the social meaning of the outcomes that eviction
courts produce, Part III.B raises the possibility that perhaps the pandemic
has not presented a housing crisis—if by crisis we mean something specific
in time and in need of technical solutions—but, rather, a magnified view of
a longstanding contest over resources. Recently, there has been increased
concern regarding the number of people losing their homes through eviction,23 but in our society unavailability of housing is not an isolated problem; for a significant portion of the population, it is and has been an
ongoing threat.24
With that historical and political perspective in mind, how should we
understand what eviction courts do? Part III concludes by arguing that eviction courts as currently designed serve to maintain the existing social order.
This social order is one in which housing is a scarce and unstable resource
for subordinated people, and such scarcity generates profit for those who
benefit from the commodification of real estate. A hierarchy between owners and tenants, perpetuated by the courts, sustains these dynamics.
While multiple social factors facilitate courts serving this role, the influence of legal doctrine itself should not be overlooked. To put it simply,
law creates evictions. To frame it in a more optimistic light, although the
legal design of eviction courts serves to entrench social hierarchies, law
remains contested, and changing it could change outcomes.
I. EVICTION

AS A

SOCIAL PHENOMENON

An eviction can be understood as a landlord’s forced removal of a
tenant from a rented home. This can occur formally—through the filing of a
court case, the issuance of a judgment for the landlord, and, if the tenant
does not vacate first, an officer of the state enforcing the landlord’s right to
the tenant’s involuntary departure. Alternatively, it may occur informally,
through harassment, incentives to vacate, threats of formal action, or other
landlord conduct that results in a tenant giving up possession without court
involvement.25 This Article focuses on formal evictions, the fear of which
almost certainly casts a shadow that contributes to the prevalence of informal evictions.
23. See sources cited supra notes 1, 20; infra notes 111–117.
24. See infra Part III.B.
25. See Matthew Desmond, Carl Gershenson & Barbara Kiviat, Forced Mobility and Residential Instability Among Urban Renters, 89 SOC. SERV. REV. 227, 246, 253, 255–56 (2015)
(describing displacement due to substandard conditions); Matthew Desmond & Tracey Schollenberger, Forced Displacement from Rental Housing: Prevalence and Neighborhood Consequences, 52 DEMOGRAPHY 1751, 1761 (2015) (describing high rates of informal evictions); see
also Matthew Desmond, Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty, 118 AM. J. SOC. 88, 95
(2012) [hereinafter Urban Poverty] (explaining that “court records do not capture informal evictions—from illegal strong-arm lockouts to unofficial agreements”).
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In a typical year before the pandemic, U.S. courts processed approximately 3.7 million eviction cases.26 Between 2000 and 2016, there was approximately one eviction filing for every seventeen renter households,27 and
roughly one in forty renter households was formally evicted.28 The number
of cases filed is different from the number of actual evictions by court order. The number of evictions following court orders is lower, due to settlements and to the minority of cases in which tenants prevail.29 But a court
filing can also result in an actual eviction even without a judgment of possession, such as through a settlement whose terms require the tenant to
vacate.30
Each one of the millions of annual evictions can carry tremendous consequences for the individuals involved, their families, and their communities.31 The harms may be physical, emotional, or economic, and they
include both short-term components and others that determine the trajectories of people’s lives.32 Immediate consequences may include the loss of
possessions; costs of relocating; missed work and school; and extreme
stress.33 They can lead to longer-term issues, such as termination from employment, or difficulty enrolling children in a new school with little notice.34 These events create logistical challenges, thwart academic and career
progression, and undermine family members’ physical and mental health.35
Aside from the trauma of the urgent and involuntary evacuation they
demand,36 court-ordered evictions bring particular economic harm because
the court records themselves can have long-lasting impacts on a person’s
credit score and rental report.37 This restricts tenants’ ability to find new
26. EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org (last visited Jan. 29, 2022).
27. National Estimates: Eviction in America, EVICTION LAB (May 11, 2018), https://eviction
lab.org/national-estimates.
28. Id.
29. See Summers, Civil Probation, supra note 5 (highlighting the high percentage of cases
that end in settlement).
30. Such settlements allow tenants to avoid judgments that will harm their credit. Unfortunately, the value of such settlements is somewhat limited for tenants, because the mere filing of a
case can cause significant damage to a tenant’s record. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Erasing the
“Scarlet E” of Eviction Records, THE LAB (Apr. 12, 2021), https://theappeal.org/the-lab/report/
erasing-the-scarlet-e-of-eviction-records.
31. Sabbeth, supra note 5, at 64–69 (highlighting eviction as category of civil cases with
collateral consequences).
32. Matthew Desmond & Rachel Tolbert Kimbro, Eviction’s Fallout: Housing, Hardship,
and Health, 94 SOC. FORCES 295, 298–99 (2015) (describing immediate harms); Id. at 316–17
(long-term harms).
33. Desmond & Kimbro, supra note 32, at 295–96, 299.
34. Desmond & Kimbro, supra note 32, at 296.
35. See id.; Allyson E. Gold, No Home for Justice: How Eviction Perpetuates Health Inequity Among Low-Income and Minority Tenants, 24 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 59, 70–73
(2016).
36. See, e.g., Eli Saslow, The Return of the 10-Minute Eviction, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2021),
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/the-return-of-the-10-minute-eviction/ar-AARPLLk?ocid=
Msedgntp.
37. Sabbeth, supra note 30.

R

R

R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\18-2\UST206.txt

366

unknown

Seq: 8

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

22-JUL-22

13:51

[Vol. 18:2

housing and to participate in other aspects of civil society.38 Notably, the
mere filing of an eviction case in court, without even reaching judgment,
can damage a tenant’s rental record and access to future housing.39
Many think of eviction as the unfortunate result of difficult circumstances, but it can also be the cause of far more difficulty to come. Studies
have shown that involuntary moves often push tenants into “worse”40
neighborhoods41—further from community supports, job opportunities, resource-rich schools, and public infrastructure like transportation and
parks42—and toward areas with increased risks of violence.43 Under time
pressure and with limited options, evicted families bunk with others in
crowded spaces or move into residences that are dangerous, with substandard conditions that violate minimum housing code requirements.44 Too
often, the alternative to crowded or dangerous conditions is homelessness,
which brings about its own unique threats to families’ physical, emotional,
and economic well-being.45 Ultimately, the event of an eviction creates setbacks that lead to sustained poverty46 and increased segregation and
inequality.47

38. Sabbeth, supra note 30.
39. Sabbeth, supra note 30.
40. I put “worse” in quotes because, to the extent that eviction results increased racial segregation, I want to be clear that moving into a neighborhood with a larger percentage of Black or
brown tenants is not inherently worse. What can make it truly worse is if that neighborhood lacks
access to amenities. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 477–78 (1976) (highlighting the
difference between an inherent desirability of proximity to whiteness—as described in Brown v.
Board of Education—and whiteness as a privilege that bestows benefits like a solid education);
see also Erika K. Wilson, Monopolizing Whiteness, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2382, 2400 (2021).
41. See Desmond, Urban Poverty, supra note 25, at 118.
42. Chester Hartman, The Case for a Right to Housing, in A RIGHT TO HOUSING: FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA 177, 180 (Rachel G. Bratt et al., eds. 2006) (“[Housing is] the
central setting for so much of one’s personal and family life as well as the locus of mobility
opportunities, access to community resources and societal status.”).
43. Nancy A. Denton, Segregation and Discrimination in Housing, in A RIGHT TO HOUSING:
FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA 61, 71 (Rachel G. Bratt et al., eds. 2006).
44. Kathryn A. Sabbeth, (Under)Enforcement of Poor Tenants’ Rights, 27 GEO J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 97, 107–11 (2019) (describing why tenants move into substandard conditions).
45. Sabbeth, supra note 5, at 389–91; Sara Rankin, Civilly Criminalizing Homelessness, 56
HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 367, 389–91 (2021); Deborah K. Padgett, Homelessness, Housing Instability and Mental Health: Making the Connections, 44 B.J. PSYCH BULLETIN 197, 197 (2020);
Desmond & Kimbro, supra note 32, at 299.
46. See sources cited supra note 45.
47. Sabbeth, supra note 30. (“Eviction records limit access to housing and thereby exacerbate
inequality. . . . Because so many landlords use eviction records in their assessment of potential
tenants, the exclusion of residents on this basis contributes to housing segregation.”); see also
Denton, supra note 43, at 71–72 (describing a “the interactive, self-reinforcing nature of residential segregation” in the context of home ownership).
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A. Eviction Causes in the Market
So, what are the causes of eviction, and why is it so widespread? The
eviction phenomenon may be understood as subset of the problem of housing affordability. Many policy analysts argue that there is a housing
shortage.48 They view this as a problem of mismatched supply and demand,
suggesting that there are literally not enough structures to house people.49
They undertake sophisticated analyses of methods for generating an increased supply of housing stock, ranging from improving zoning laws50 to
offering incentives to private developers.51 These discussions can be useful,
but they portray housing as a scarce resource.
Another frame for the problem of affordable housing is to examine the
market conditions that make housing appear scarce. This emphasizes the
significance of social structures, rather than just physical structures.52 That
perspective is important for analyzing the threats to maintaining housing
that already exists and for conceptualizing the distribution questions that
underlie the apparent absence of housing as a resource.53
Looking at market conditions reveals a significant gap between the
cost of housing and income streams available to cover it. For the past few
decades, pre-pandemic, housing costs have grown faster than inflation,
while wages and other income supports have stagnated or disappeared.54
Rent as a share of household budget has grown, so it no longer occupies
one-third of a family’s budget, but often consumes fifty percent or more.55
48. See, e.g., Kathleen Howley, Housing Shortage Likely to Outlast Other Pandemic-Driven
Scarcities, FORBES (Oct. 24, 2021).
49. Uri Berliner, The Housing Shortage is Significant. It’s Acute for Small, Entry-Level
Homes, NPR (Sept. 4, 2021) (“The country is nearly 4 million homes short of demand.”)
50. See, e.g., Solomon Greene, & Ingrid Gould Ellen, Breaking Barriers, Boosting Supply:
How the Federal Government Can Help Eliminate Exclusionary Zoning, URBAN INSTITUTE 1, 2–4
(2020).
51. See Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould Ellen & Katherine O’Regan, Supply Skepticism: Housing
Supply and Affordability, NYU FURMAN CENTER (2018).
52. See Ezra Rosser, Shelter, Mobility, and the Voucher Program, 85 BRIGHAM-KANNER
PROP. RIGHTS J. 85, 88 (2021) (describing federal government’s “move from brick-and-mortar
construction [of public housing] and towards rental subsidies, i.e., vouchers”).
53. Cf. KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE REAL INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP (2019) (describing how in the 1960s and 1970s,
the nation’s first programs to encourage Black homeownership ended in Black foreclosures and
property losses).
54. See Desmond & Kimbro, supra note 32, at 297–98 (summarizing literature).
55. Whitney Airgood-Obrycki, Alexander Hermann & Sophia Wedeen, The Rent Eats First:
Rental Housing Unaffordability in the US, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV. 1 (2021),
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/research/files/harvard_jchs_rent_eats_first_air
good-obrycki_hermann_wedeen_2021.pdf (“Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, renters in the
United States were facing a housing affordability crisis. Nearly a quarter of renter households
were spending more than half of their incomes on rent each month.”); Andrew Aurand, Dan
Emmanuel, Ikra Rafi, Dan Threet & Diane Yentel, OUT OF REACH: THE HIGH COST OF HOUSING,
NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL. 8 (2021) [hereinafter OUT OF REACH], https://nlihc.org/sites/
default/files/oor/2021/Out-of-Reach_2021.pdf (“Prior to the pandemic . . . 85% of extremely low-
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When rent eats a big share of the budget, it creates two problems. First, rent
gets prioritized, so people have less left for healthcare, food, toiletries, and
other essentials, not to mention the small treats that can help make life
worth living.56 Second, people are barely able to cover housing costs, and
any sudden loss of income or increase in expenses, such as reduced work
hours or a car maintenance emergency, will make the challenges of housing
costs insurmountable. A person can fall behind on rent for one month and
find herself in eviction court.57
The gap between housing costs and family income tells part of the
story of why this happens, but it still leaves out a few pieces. For one, why
does this gap exist between family resources and the cost of housing? For
another, why does that gap result in people losing their homes? For the
answers to these questions, we turn to law.
B. Eviction Causes in the Law
As John Fabian Witt reminds us in American Contagions, laws of the
market are not natural but rather constructed by society. Professor Witt explains, “For most people living in the United States, the law of the marketplace—the basic rules of private property, contract law and tort law—
determine[ ] access to basic needs. Labor law set[s] the terms of people’s
employment.”58 If people cannot earn enough to pay for their housing, and
the government provides neither housing nor the financial support to
purchase it, these are not natural occurrences based on something essential
to housing, but rather they are the products of how entitlements are defined
and enforced.59 The market does not act independent from law. Moreover,
there is no such thing as the absence of regulation; the question is only what
kind of regulation exists and what kinds of activity does it support or undermine.60 In other words, there is never a legal vacuum but always a legal
environment that shapes outcomes.
Multiple, varied sets of laws come into play in creating the eviction
crisis. It is impossible to catalogue them all here, but these are some of the
most important. First, on the income side of the equation, labor laws and
income renters could not afford their rent, and 70% were spending more than half of their incomes
on housing costs.”).
56. Airgood-Obrycki, Hermann & Wedeen, supra note 55, at 3 (“And with high housing
costs that consume a substantial portion of household income, there is often little money left over
to cover basic needs.”); OUT OF REACH, supra note 55, at 8 (“Severely housing cost-burdened
households have to sacrifice other basic necessities to pay the rent—to cut back on basic nutrition
or forgo needed medical care.”)
57. Airgood-Obrycki, Hermann & Wedeen, supra note 55, at 3 (“Rent is also an expense that
occurs on a fixed schedule and must be paid or the household will face eviction.”).
58. WITT, supra note 7, at 129.
59. Sabbeth, supra note 44, at 107–11.
60. DAVID MADDEN & HERBERT MARCUSE, IN DEFENSE OF HOUSING: THE POLITICS OF CRISIS 46–47, 131 (2016).
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public benefits laws shape family earnings.61 Second, regulations that encourage the commodification of housing, its sale and rental for profit, and
particular forms of investment in it determine how expensive it will be.62
These financial circumstances are created by policy choices. As one example, laws governing real estate investment trusts support the treatment of
real estate as a liquid commodity and thereby shape the market for homes.63
Third, laws of property and contracts define who is an owner, who is a
tenant, what are the benefits and burdens of each, and which members of
society occupy each position.64 That eviction is not a natural phenomenon
is underscored by the fact that it occurs for members of particular social
groups far more than others. Black women with children are dramatically
overrepresented.65 Intentional discrimination is likely one of the reasons for
this.66 I have written in detail elsewhere about additional reasons why Black
women and their children are so frequently impacted.67 For purposes of this
paper, however, I want to focus on the impact of laws, and here I will
highlight one particularly large and important category of laws.
The circumstances of renters in this country cannot be accurately understood without appreciating the far-ranging consequences of the laws that
have supported the historical and present-day theft of labor and land from
Black Americans and other people of color, while generating white wealth
and promoting white ownership. These laws stretch from those permitting
white colonists’ theft of land from Native Americans,68 to laws authorizing
the ownership of Black people and their products during slavery and beyond,69 to those that defined racial categories and reserved privileges for
whites during Jim Crow,70 to others explicitly excluding Black Americans
from federal subsidies for home ownership and other wealth building op61. WITT, supra note 7, at 129.
62. MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 60, at 46–47, 131.
63. MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 60, at 34.
64. See also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1720–21
(1993) (describing how whiteness was embedded in the definition of property rights and who
could exercise them, while Black Americans became commodified as objects of property).
65. Peter Hepburn, Renee Louis & Matthew Desmond, Racial and Gender Disparities
Among Evicted Americans, 7 SOCIO. SCI. 649, 653–56 (2020).
66. See Racial Discrimination and Eviction Policies and Enforcement in New York: A Report of the New York Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 83–86,
106–07 (March 2022).
67. See Sabbeth, Housing Defense, supra note 5, at 90–94; Kathryn A. Sabbeth & Jessica K.
Steinberg, The Gender of Gideon, 69 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 13–15).
68. See generally BRENNA BHANDAR, COLONIAL LIVES OF PROPERTY (2018); K-Sue Park,
Race, Innovation, and Financial Growth: The Example of Foreclosure, in HISTORIES OF RACIAL
CAPITALISM 27 (Destin Jenkins & Justin Leroy eds., 2021) (describing creation of foreclosure as
legal device for white colonists to steal land from Native Americans).
69. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 64, at 1718–21.
70. See, e.g., Frances L. Edwards & Grayson Bennett Thomson, The Legal Creation of
Raced Space: The Subtle and Ongoing Discrimination Created Through Jim Crow Laws, 12
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 145, 151–55 (2010).
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portunities offered to whites,71 to those that supported the creation and exploitation of subprime markets for Black families,72 and to those that today
continue to permit discrimination73 and perpetuate generational wealth74
and poverty.75 It is no accident that Black Americans are overrepresented
among tenants,76 given that they have been repeatedly deprived of the status
of ownership.
It is also no coincidence that the rights of property owners, particularly
the right to exclude,77 have been defined so robustly, while tenants’ rights
have been paltry.78 Laws define who occupies each legal category—tenant
or owner—and what will be the significance of that status in terms of rights

71. See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017); Mehrsa Baradaran, Jim Crow Credit, 9 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 887, 887 (2019) (describing how the state created a “separate and unequal credit market—
high-interest, non-bank, installment lenders in black ghettos and low-cost, securitized, and revolving credit card market in the white suburbs”).
72. See TAYLOR, supra note 53.
73. See Michele Gilman, A Court for the One Percent: How the Supreme Court Contributes
to Economic Inequality, 3 UTAH L. REV. 389, 427–28 (2014); Nikole Hannah-Jones, Living Apart:
How the Government Betrayed a Landmark Civil Rights Law, PRO PUBLICA (June 25, 2015, 1:26
PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/living-apart-how-the-government-betrayed-a-landmarkcivil-rights-law (describing how the federal government declined to enforce the Fair Housing
Act); Douglas S. Massey, The Legacy of the 1968 Fair Housing Act, 30 SOCIO. FORUM 571,
578–82 (2015).
74. See DOROTHY A. BROWN, THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH: HOW THE TAX SYSTEM IMPOVERISHES BLACK AMERICANS—AND HOW WE CAN FIX IT (2021).
75. See SHERYLL CASHIN, WHITE SPACE, BLACK HOOD: OPPORTUNITY HOARDING AND SEGREGATION IN THE AGE OF INEQUALITY (2021).
76. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV. OFF. OF POL’Y DEV. & RSCH., AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY 2017 RESULTS (2018), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/ahs/2017/info
graphs/2017%20Housing%20Profile%20Renters%20Profile.pdf.
77. See Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489
(2021) (prioritizing right to exclude as fundamental); Harris, supra note 64, at 1736 (“Many theorists have traditionally conceptualized property to include the exclusive rights of use, disposition,
and possession, with possession embracing the absolute right to exclude. The right to exclude was
the central principle, too, of whiteness as identity, for mainly whiteness has been characterized,
not by an inherent unifying characteristic, but by the exclusion of others deemed to be ‘not
white.’”). Tenants’ right to exclude is a subject worthy of a separate essay. Compare Sherman P.
Kimball, Landlord’s Right to Enter, 46 CHI. B. REC. 438, 438–39 (1965), with Jason Paul Bailey,
Are Landlords the New Police? The Unintended Consequences of the Arkansas Residential Landlord-Tenant Act’s Access Provision, 67 ARK. L. REV. 627, 628 (2014), and NAT’L L. CTR. ON
HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS: ENDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 57 (2019), https://homelesslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/HOUS
ING-NOT-HANDCUFFS-2019-FINAL.pdf.
78. See Sarah Schindler & Kellen Zale, The Anti-Tenancy Doctrine, 171 PENN. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 54–57) (noting that “anti-tenancy” is “deeply embedded in the common law of property” but also that Black people in the U.S. South after the Civil War were often
sharecroppers, and anti-tenancy doctrines discriminated against them), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4068843.
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and freedoms.79 Those rights and freedoms then shape our seemingly “neutral”80 market-based relations.
Eviction depends on the statutes and common law that define the rights
and responsibilities of landlords and tenants. These include the substantive
rights of property ownership and rental, as well as the law governing hierarchies among rights when they conflict. The law also governs the procedures
for what should happen when an owner of real estate wants to seize possession of a property where a tenant lives.81 The law determines the process
for adjudication of such disputes. As will be discussed further in Part II, the
court process has been designed to promote easy, swift evictions.82 Before
turning to the courts’ operations during the pandemic, the next subpart will
first introduce the social context of eviction in the pandemic.
C. Eviction in the Pandemic: Inequality Exacerbated
Inequality is embedded in eviction, and Professor Witt’s book emphasizes that the pandemic, too, is entangled with inequality. He offers important observations about how, throughout history, the spread of disease has
depended on social circumstances and varied by social status.83 COVID-19
has been no different. As of the time of this writing, the death rates due to
COVID-19 for Black Americans and other people of color have been significantly higher than for whites.84 The statistics provide a gruesome illustration of how, like eviction, disease is not merely natural but socially
constructed.
The intersection between the pandemic and the eviction phenomenon
exacerbated the inequalities of eviction in at least three ways. First, as is
well-known, the pandemic brought devastating economic consequences to
millions. Because of the economic fallout of the pandemic, the threat of
eviction spread dramatically. At one point, the Aspen Institute predicted
that approximately forty million people were at risk.85 Although millions of
79. Id. at 6–52 (summarizing doctrines across a wide range of areas—from voting to tax to
free speech—that privilege owners over tenants).
80. WITT, supra note 7, at 12.
81. These laws vary from state to state but share many similarities. See generally LSC Eviction Laws Database, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. (Jan. 1, 2021), https://www.lsc.gov/initiatives/effectstate-local-laws-evictions/lsc-eviction-laws-database.
82. See infra Part II.A (describing eviction procedures).
83. See e.g., WITT, supra note 7, at 128–32.
84. Carla K. Johnson, Olga R. Rodriguez & Angeliki Kastanis, As US COVID-19 Death Toll
Nears 600,000, Racial Gaps Persist, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 14, 2021), https://apnews.com/
article/baltimore-california-coronavirus-pandemic-race-and-ethnicity-health-341950a902affc
651dc268dba6d83264.
85. Emily Benfer, David Bloom Robinson, Stacy Butler, Lavar Edmonds, Sam Gilman,
Katherine Lucas Mckay, Lisa Owens, Neil Steinkamp, Diane Yentel & Zach Neumann, The
COVID-19 Eviction Crisis: An Estimated 30-40 Million People in America Are at Risk, ASPEN
INST. (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/the-covid-19-eviction-crisis-anestimated-30-40-million-people-in-america-are-at-risk.
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dollars have been pledged for rental assistance, as of the time of this writing, that money largely has not reached those who need it, and millions of
evictions are still predicted.86
Evictions are not simply the product of inequality but the cause of it,87
and the far-reaching economic consequences of the pandemic mean that
millions more families are in danger of being pushed further down the social ladder. If evicted, they are more likely to experience the many physical,
emotional, and economic consequences of eviction.88 In particular, the
records of the evictions during the pandemic will follow the tenants for
years to come, frustrating their attempts to recover.89
Second, the race and gender inequities of eviction are likely multiplying. Prior to the pandemic, empirical evidence showed that women and people of color were more likely to be named in eviction cases and more likely
to be actually evicted as a result of those cases.90 Eviction already impacted
Black women with children more than any other group.91
The people hit hardest by the pandemic are the same groups at disproportional risk of eviction before it. The job sectors that experienced the
most downturn were those with low-wage-earners, overwhelmingly people
of color, especially women who worked in childcare.92 Additionally, women experienced job losses because they provided most of the care for children during online school and for relatives who become sick.93 Although
we lack empirical evidence showing increased racial and gender inequality
in pandemic evictions, we may still see it in the months and years ahead.94
Finally, the pandemic has made the health threats of eviction increasingly dangerous. Prior to the pandemic, eviction and resulting homelessness
86. Glenn Thrush & Alan Rappeport, About 89% of Rental Assistance Funds Have Not Been
Distributed, Figures Show, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2021, 7:13 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/08/25/us/politics/eviction-rental-assistance.html.
87. See supra notes 32–46 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 32–46 and accompanying text.
89. See Sabbeth, supra note 30.
90. Hepburn, Louis & Desmond, supra note 65, at 653–55.
91. Hepburn, Louis & Desmond, supra note 65, at 659.
92. Naomi R. Cahn & Linda C. McClain, Gendered Complications of COVID-19: Towards a
Feminist Recovery Plan, 22 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 4 (2021); Catherine Powell, The Color and
Gender of COVID: Essential Workers, Not Disposable People, THINK GLOB. HEALTH (June 4,
2020), https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/color-and-gender-covid-essential-workers-notdisposable-people; see also Angela P. Harris, Amy Kapczynski & Noah Zatz, Where Is the Political Economy?, LPE PROJECT (June 21, 2021), https://lpeproject.org/blog/where-is-the-politicaleconomy (arguing that political economy must be defined to include childcare).
93. Claire Cain Miller, The Pandemic Created a Child-Care Crisis. Mothers Bore the Burden., N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/05/17/upshot/wo
men-workforce-employment-covid.html; Ella Koeze, A Year Later, Who Is Back to Work and
Who Is Not?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/03/09/busi
ness/economy/covid-employment-demographics.html.
94. But see Peter Hepburn et al., U.S. Eviction Filing Patterns in 2020, 7 SOCIUS 1, 9–10
(2021) (showing that racial and gender disparities in eviction persisted in the pandemic, but not
demonstrating any increase and potentially suggesting a very slight decrease).
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created long-lasting problems for mental and physical health, particularly
but not only for children.95 COVID-19, however, has created new risks and
increased the likelihood of others. The frequent consequences of eviction—
being pushed into crowded living arrangements, common spaces like shelters or public streets, or substandard housing units—raise more acute risks
of illness and even death.96
Eviction in the pandemic compounds pre-existing inequities of the
health care system. People of color are already more vulnerable.97 This is
due to a constellation of factors ranging from unsafe physical environments,98 to the stresses of racism,99 to the minimizing of their reports of
pain,100 and overall lesser medical treatment.101
Borrowing from the insights of historian Frank Snowden, Professor
Witt argues that “the legal system’s responses to the coronavirus controversies” reveal a great deal about our “society’s structure” and “political priorities.”102 The legal system’s response to the prospect of millions of evictions
has been no exception.
II. EVICTION COURTS

IN A

PANDEMIC

To the extent that government actors have sought to prevent the
threatened tsunami of evictions during the pandemic, they have done so
primarily in two ways. First, they have approved issuance of funds so that
landlords may collect rent even if tenants are unable to pay it.103 Second, at
95. See sources cited supra note 45.
96. Emily A. Benfer, David Vlahov, Marissa Y. Long, Evan Walker-Wells, J.L. Pottenger,
Jr., Gregg Gonsalves & Danya E. Keene, Eviction, Health Inequity, and the Spread of COVID-19:
Housing Policy as a Primary Pandemic Mitigation Strategy, 98 J. URB. HEALTH 1, 2 (2021);
Kathryn M. Leifheit, Sabriya L. Linton, Julia Raifman, Gabriel L. Schwartz, Emily A. Benfer,
Frederick J. Zimmerman & Craig Evan Pollack, Expiring Eviction Moratoriums and COVID-19
Incidence and Mortality, 190 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 2563, 2563 (2021).
97. See Martha A. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 3–4 (2008).
98. Kelli DePriest & Arlene Butz, Neighborhood-Level Factors Related to Asthma in Children Living in Urban Areas: An Integrative Literature Review, 33 J. SCH. NURSING. 8, 8–9 (2017);
David Mudarri & William J. Fisk, Public Health and Economic Impact of Dampness and Mold,
17 INDOOR AIR 226, 229, 232–35 (2007); OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES., THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO PROMOTE HEALTHY
HOMES VII (2009).
99. Jenna Wortham, Racism’s Psychological Toll, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 24, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/06/24/magazine/racisms-psychological-toll.html.
100. Sabbeth, supra note 44, at 125.
101. Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 88
(2014).
102. WITT, supra note 7, at 120–21 (quoting FRANK M. SNOWDEN, EPIDEMICS AND SOCIETY:
FROM THE BLACK DEATH TO THE PRESENT 7 (2019)).
103. In addition to rental assistance, government actors have approved childcare tax credits,
increased unemployment benefits, and other supplements which help tenants pay rent.
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the local, state, and federal levels, they have created partial104 eviction
moratoria.
The issuance of rental assistance reveals much about our “society’s
structure” and “political priorities.”105 The size of rental assistance grants is
unprecedented in our nation’s history, which might appear to suggest a
break from the past, but the model’s steadfast commitment to maintaining
tenants’ obligation to pay rent, and landlords’ entitlement to collect it, is
perhaps more telling. Just for comparison, another option could have been
to forgive rent for low-income tenants106 and to provide financial support
directly to landlords who demonstrate need.107 Imagine a program that did
not put tenants in the middle but required landlords to apply and show need,
quality of conditions, and long-term commitment to maintaining decent and
affordable housing.108 Yet, instead of cancelling the rent,109 we have erected structures that leave the burden—for administrative efforts,110 stress
if the disbursements flow more slowly than the court dockets,111 and the
ultimate cost if landlords thwart the rescue effort112—on tenants. And re104. All eviction moratoria include some exceptions.
105. WITT, supra note 7, at 120–21 (quoting FRANK M. SNOWDEN, EPIDEMICS AND SOCIETY:
FROM THE BLACK DEATH TO THE PRESENT 7 (2019)).
106. See, e.g., Rent and Mortgage Cancellation Act of 2020, H.R. 6515, 116th Cong. (2020).
107. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth & Sophie House, When the Home Is the Hazard: Pandemic
Responses Must Address Housing Conditions, NEXT CITY (Mar. 4, 2021), https://nextcity.org/
urbanist-news/when-the-home-is-the-hazard-pandemic-responses-address-housing-conditions
(recommending assistance directly to landlords, on the condition that they demonstrate need and
provide safe, affordable housing).
108. Id.
109. Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, Cancel the Rent, NEW YORKER (May 12, 2020), https://
www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/cancel-the-rent; Sasha Plotnikova, The Case for Making the Rent Disappear, L. & POL. ECON. PROJECT: L. & POL. ECON. BLOG (Feb. 23, 2021), https:/
/lpeproject.org/blog/the-case-for-making-rent-disappear/.
110. See Annie Lowrey, The Time Tax, THE ATL. (July 27, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2021/07/how-government-learned-waste-your-time-tax/619568 (arguing that
in many areas of public benefits, the government has “purposefully made the system difficult,
shifting the burden of public administration onto individuals and discouraging millions of Americans from seeking aid. The government rations public services through perplexing, unfair bureaucratic friction. And when people do not get help designed for them, well, that is their own fault.
The time tax is worse for individuals who are struggling than for the rich; larger for Black families
than for white families; harder on the sick than on the healthy.”).
111. Chris Arnold, Millions Could Face Eviction with Federal Moratorium Ending and a
Logjam in Aid, NPR (June 10, 2021, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/06/10/1004046446/
millions-could-face-eviction-with-federal-moratorium-ending-and-log-jam-in-aid; CONG. RSCH.
SERV., PANDEMIC RELIEF: THE EMERGENCY RENTAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (Oct. 21, 2021),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46688 (“Treasury data on spending of ERA-1
funds showed that approximately $7.5 billion of the $25 billion in ERA-1 funding allocated to
states and localities had been spent . . . . The rate of expenditure of ERA-1 funds has caused some
to raise concerns . . . “).
112. Arthur Delaney, Some Landlords Would Rather Evict Tenants Than Accept Federal Aid,
HUFFPOST (Sept. 17, 2021, 5:45 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/emergency-rental-assist
ance-program-landlords_n_61439bdce4b0d808bf26967e; Ben Sessoms, 160 Tenants Behind on
Rent Applied for Aid. Their Landlord Won’t Accept the Money, NEWS & OBSERVER (Oct.2, 2021,
9:49 AM), https://www.newsobserver.com/article254471218.html#storylink=cpy; see also NAT’L
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gardless of whether a landlord is a “mom-and-pop” seeking to cover the
expenses of maintenance,113 or multinational investment firm seeking to
maximize profits without even fulfilling its basic responsibilities under the
local housing code,114 making the owner financially whole has been treated
as a first principle.
A handful of jurisdictions have increased substantive protections for
tenants.115 Here, local officials have thrown support behind measures to
prevent evictions, and their collateral consequences, both in the pandemic
and beyond.116 These have included “just cause” laws that require landlords
to state a reason for refusing to renew a lease, records-sealing measures that
mitigate some of the damage done by the collection and distribution of
court records of eviction filings and judgments, right-to-counsel initiatives,
and others.117
At the same time, courts have continued with evictions. The U.S. Supreme Court invited118 and then embraced constitutional and statutory challenges to the eviction moratoria,119 while some lower courts simply defied
HOUS. L. PROJECT, EVICTIONS SURVEY: WHAT’S HAPPENING ON THE GROUND 2–3 (2021), https://
www.nhlp.org/wp-content/uploads/NHLP-evictions-survey-2021.pdf (describing landlord refusal
of funds, misrepresentations regarding receipt of funds, and pursuit of evictions even after funds
collected).
113. See Jerusalem Demsas, The Pandemic Was Hard for Everyone — Except Maybe Landlords, VOX (Nov. 4, 2021, 9:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/2021/11/4/22759224/landlords-rentrelief-eviction-moratorium-cash-balance-covid-19 (describing “the narrative about the plight of
the small landlord”).
114. See, e.g., Marisa Peñaloza, Housing Conditions in This Low-Income Neighborhood
Pushed Tenants to Sue the Landlord, NPR (July 22, 2021, 8:16 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/
07/22/1018018025/housing-low-income-neighborhood-tenants-landlord-lawsuit (describing business model of investment firm seeking to maximize profits, while tenants live in squalor due to
landlords’ negligence of basic maintenance duties).
115. Will Parker, New Local Laws Aim to Stop Rising Evictions, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 25, 2021,
5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-local-laws-aim-to-stop-rising-evictions11640428202.
116. Amanda Holpuch, Tenant Organizers Poised to Secure Significant Protections for US
Renters, GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/oct/08/
tenant-organizers-protections-renters.
117. Id.; Cortlynn Stark, ‘A Win for Kansas City’: Council Passes Tenant’s Right to Counsel.
Here’s Why It Matters, KAN. CITY STAR (Dec. 9, 2021), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/awin-for-kansas-city-council-passes-tenants-right-to-counsel-heres-why-it-matters/ar-AARFjQc;
Conor Morris, Cleveland Right to Counsel Shows Promising Early Results for Tenants and Some
Landlords, WKSU (July 2, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.wksu.org/government-politics/2021-0702/cleveland-right-to-counsel-shows-promising-early-results-for-tenants-and-some-landlords; Allison Dikanovic, Tenants’ ‘Right to Counsel’ Expands Citywide. Here’s Why that’s a Big Deal,
THE CITY (May 20, 2021, 5:44 PM), https://www.thecity.nyc/2021/5/20/22444023/right-to-coun
sel-expands-citywide-why-thats-a-big-deal-tenants-nyc.
118. In Kavanaugh’s concurrence with the majority’s June 2021 decision not to strike down
the eviction moratorium at that time, he encouraged the challengers to return later that summer: “I
vote at this time to deny the application to vacate the District Court’s stay of its order. In my view,
clear and specific congressional authorization (via new legislation) would be necessary for the
CDC to extend the moratorium past July 31.” Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health and
Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2320, 2321 (2021) (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 2486.
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them.120 Courts have prioritized owners’ entitlement to evict over tenants’
entitlement to shelter.121 These judges have made it crystal clear that the
moratoria contravened what they understand as a core function of the
courts—to protect owners’ control over property above all else.122
The law of eviction courts reflects this priority. As Part II.A will show,
governing laws structure eviction courts to promote landlords’ ability to
obtain quick judgments. The design of eviction courts emphasizes speed,
while it deemphasizes testing the landlord’s capacity to meet the burden of
proof.123 The courts’ design features do not lend themselves to careful
parsing of claims and defenses. As will be discussed in Part II.B, the design
of eviction courts helps to explain the courts’ failure reliably to implement
the eviction moratoria.124
A. Eviction Court Design
The structure of eviction courts depends in part on their jurisdiction, as
designed by state and local statutes.125 Depending on the state and locality,
an eviction case can be heard in the first instance in a lower-level court that
handles a mix of matters, housing cases only, or evictions only.126 For purposes of clarity, I will refer to all courts handling eviction cases as eviction
courts.
120. See, e.g., Megan Kimble, The CDC Halted Evictions. Texas Judges Are Proceeding Anyway., TEX. OBSERVER (Aug. 16, 2021, 9:10 AM), https://www.texasobserver.org/the-cdc-haltedevictions-texas-judges-are-proceeding-anyway.
121. See, e.g., Alabama Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489 (“The equities do not justify
depriving the [landlords] of the District Court’s judgment in their favor. The moratorium has put
the applicants, along with millions of landlords across the country, at risk of irreparable harm by
depriving them of rent payments with no guarantee of eventual recovery. . . . [P]reventing them
from evicting tenants who breach their leases intrudes on one of the most fundamental elements of
property ownership—the right to exclude.”). Incidentally, evicted tenants will not likely pay any
back rent, so the Court’s decision to permit eviction out of concern for landlords’ right to collect
rent must rest on an assumption that the market will provide new tenants to pay future rents. Even
if that assumption is correct, eviction will not make landlords whole for any past due rent, whereas
what could make them whole would be to halt evictions and instead to accept the approximately
50 billion dollars of rental assistance approved by Congress.
122. Id.; see infra Part III (analyzing the social function of eviction courts).
123. See also Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise: Understanding Relational and Substantive Expertise through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 AM. SOCIO. REV. 909, 925 (2015)
(summarizing literature showing “average time consumed by each case often two minutes or less”
and “judges often shortcut the law: they do not hold landlords to statutory burdens of proof”).
124. See, e.g., Kristian Hernández & Cristian ArguetaSoto, Local Judges Decide Fate of Many
Renters Facing Eviction, PEW (Aug. 13, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analy
sis/blogs/stateline/2021/08/13/local-judges-decide-fate-of-many-renters-facing-eviction (describing local variation in applicability of federal moratorium).
125. Federal law largely avoided the subject of eviction prior to the pandemic, but the federal
moratoria also impacted the courts’ subject matter jurisdiction, as they carved out a class of cases
in which the courts could not issue the relief previously available.
126. See LSC Eviction Laws Database, supra note 81 (Question 16 shows the range of courts
hearing evictions).
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In a surprising number of jurisdictions, eviction courts are fora designed to resolve disputes over small amounts of money: small claims
courts.127 It is telling that the business of permanently ordering people out
of their homes, which is a form of fairly significant injunctive relief, is
assigned to these courts otherwise entrusted only with small matters. Query
whether one forum is appropriate for both types of cases. Do they share
something in common, either in legal complexity or in social
importance?128
Even in those states that do not explicitly identify evictions as small
matters, that portrayal of them is evident in the rules that govern their adjudication. Across the United States, despite some variation, eviction courts
possess certain shared design features.129 Here are ten key design features
that shape their culture and outcomes.
1. Low Filing Fees
The laws governing filing fees make it less expensive to file a civil
lawsuit in eviction court than in other courts.130 Eviction filing fees range
from $35 to $285, with most states’ fees at around $50.131 Filing other types
of state court cases tends to cost roughly twice as much as filing a civil
action for eviction.132 Nationally, the typical eviction filing fee of approximately $50 is seven times smaller than the fee for filing in federal court.133
Low filing fees contribute to making it cheaper to evict a tenant from a
home than to obtain most other forms of civil relief.
127. See, e.g., Ajax Wooley, Eviction in Durham Isn’t a “Small Claim” Anymore,
DATAWORKS, (Mar. 11, 2022) https://dataworks-nc.org/2022/eviction-in-durham-isnt-a-smallclaim-anymore/; see also LSC Eviction Laws Database, supra note 81 (Question 16) (identifying
various courts that hear eviction cases).
128. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Simplicity as Justice, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 287, 302 (2018) [hereinafter “Simplicity”] (critiquing the perception that poor people’s legal issues are simple); Kathryn
A. Sabbeth, Market-Based Law Development, LPE PROJECT (July 21, 2021) [hereinafter “MarketBased Law”], https://lpeproject.org/blog/market-based-law-development (arguing that treating
poor people’s legal issues as simple, and funding poor people’s courts accordingly, reflects political choices).
129. See LSC Eviction Laws Database, supra note 81.
130. See SARAH ABDELHADI & RANYA AHMED, FAST & CHEAP: THE SPEED AND COST OF
EVICTING TENANTS FOR NONPAYMENT OF RENT 8 (2021), https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/
f644d5b4deb04a158f6929d928035af9 (“As of January 2021, 22 states/territories have eviction filing fees below $100, 13 of which are below $50. Because they can be considered operating expenses, landlords may be able to deduct filing fees and other legal costs associated with eviction
from their federal income taxes, making eviction an even cheaper option.”).
131. See LSC Eviction Laws Database, supra note 81.
132. See e.g., N.C.G.S. § 7A-305 (charging $180 to file a superior court action, $150 to file a
district court action, and $96 to file in the small claims courts that hear evictions).
133. See FAQS: Filing a Case, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/faqs-filing-case (“The
current fee [for filing a civil action in district court] is $350.”).
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2. Shortened Timeframe
State statutes generally refer to eviction cases as “summary” proceedings, which reflects that they are designed and expected to move quickly.134
After service of a summons and complaint, civil litigation typically allows
the defendant twenty to thirty days to file an answer.135 Tenants facing
eviction from their homes, however, are typically required to answer—and
also to prepare fully for trial—within three to fourteen days after service of
the complaint.136 The U.S. Supreme Court approved these short timeframes,
upholding as constitutional an Oregon statute that allowed six days to answer and prepare for trial, on the basis that tenants’ defenses are too simple
to deserve more time.137
Importantly, in the same decision as it approved these short
timeframes, the Court also approved Oregon’s substantive restrictions on
the defenses tenants may raise. The Court concluded that “the simplicity of
the issues in the typical [eviction] action will not usually require extended
trial preparation and litigation,” at the same time it ruled in favor of restricting those issues.138 The ruling thereby relies on a circular logic or at least
creates a self-fulfilling prophecy.139 Given the Court’s role in creating precedent, its treatment of eviction as simple simultaneously justifies and perpetuates the speed of the process.140
Speedy processes not only sacrifice careful analyses and accurate outcomes,141 but also they increase the bargaining power of plaintiffs.142 Designing eviction courts to process cases quickly carries implications for the
134. Spector, supra note 5, at 137 (“A summary proceeding for eviction exists in every state.
Despite its different labels-summary process, summary dispossession, or forcible entry and detainer—a basic feature of the proceeding is its limited nature.”).
135. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12; N.C. R. CIV. P. 12.
136. See LSC Eviction Laws Database, supra note 81.
137. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 65 (1972).
138. Id.; see id. at 64–69 (approving Oregon provision that forbid consideration of any issue
other than whether rent was paid, excluding consideration of the landlord’s breach of the warranty
of habitability); infra Part II.B.6 (discussing eviction courts’ limits on counterclaims and defenses
that tenants may raise).
139. See Sabbeth, Simplicity supra note 128, at 302 (arguing that “the underdevelopment of
law on behalf of the poor recreates itself in an unfortunate feedback loop” whereby the Supreme
Court denies the right to counsel to litigants with purportedly “simple” claims, thereby decreasing
the availability of lawyers who could develop the common law governing those claims); Sabbeth,
supra note 44, at 135–37 (arguing that courts “underdevelop” tenants’ rights through “snowballing underenforcement”).
140. See Sabbeth, Market-Based Law, supra note 128 (“Assumptions about whose cases are
worthy of attention legitimize the simplification of entire bodies of law and de-legalization of
lower status courts.”).
141. See Sabbeth, Simplicity, supra note 128, at 294.
142. See id. at 295–96 (describing how delay can benefit tenant-defendants); see also Sabbeth,
supra note 5, at 110 (describing how plaintiffs’ control over timing of litigation can be used to
pressure defendants).
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out-of-court relationships between the parties.143 It also underscores the role
that the state plays in those relationships; the state could serve to restrain
uses of force or, instead, to bolster and legitimize them.144 Short timeframes
that rush cases to judgment make the courts less like fora for application of
the rule of law and more like asset collection devices or means for forcible
removal.145
3. Limited Discovery
In ordinary civil litigation, discovery is a significant part of the process
and determines outcomes.146 Civil Procedure Rules 26 through 37, and Rule
45, together provide discovery tools, through which the parties exchange
information and evidence to unearth facts in advance of trial. The purposes
of the discovery rules include promoting accurate outcomes and fairness, as
well as efficient evaluation of settlement alternatives.147 Yet eviction court
rules often do not permit discovery or else require a special request and
judicial permission for it.148 Even when statutes technically permit it, the
short timeline between service and trial can make discovery impractical or
impossible to complete.
4. Substandard Service Method
Aside from the shortened timeframe that follows service of the complaint, another aspect of the service of process is also distinct. The majority
of states allow landlords to notify tenants of the lawsuits by posting legal
papers on the front door of the home and then putting the papers in the regular mail, without certification, confirmation, return receipt requested, or
143. See Sabbeth, Simplicity, supra note 128, at 295–96 (describing how delay can sometimes
provide the only restraint on the exertion of force).
144. Id. at 296–98 (describing procedural rules that “erect obstacles between the individual
and the force of the state” and noting the violent role of the state that removes evicted tenants by
force).
145. See id.; Tonya Brito, Kathryn Sabbeth, Jessica Steinberg, & Lauren Sudeall, Racial Capitalism in the Civil Courts, 122 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 27–31)
(describing how lower civil courts facilitate the transfer of assets from people of color to majoritywhite corporations or the state itself); Daniel Wilf-Townsend, Assembly-Line Plaintiffs, 135
HARV. L. REV. 1704, 1743 (2022) (describing lower civil courts “as a site for private companies to
petition the state for permission to redistribute others’ assets to themselves—permission which
appears to be granted frequently without much, if any, scrutiny”).
146. See, e.g., Diego Zambrano, Missing Discovery in Lawyerless Courts, 122 COLUM. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2022) (on file with author) (manuscript at 1) (describing discovery as “the
most distinctive feature of American civil procedure” and as the “backbone” or “central axis” of
civil litigation).
147. See id. (manuscript at 25) (describing discovery values of “fairness, accuracy, settlement,
and regulation”).
148. See id. (manuscript at 18–21); LSC Eviction Laws Database, supra note 81.
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other measures to ensure delivery of the papers.149 In no comparable lawsuit of which I am aware is this a permissible form of service.150 Service by
posting on property might be standard for in rem and quasi in rem cases on
the theory that a property’s occupant must be a good steward of the property and keep alert for notices posted on it. While the history and motivations behind that legal innovation are beyond the scope of this article,151 the
practical implications today, when so many live in urban spaces, are concerning. Even the U.S. Supreme Court at one point acknowledged that service by posting in an apartment building may not satisfy minimal standards
of due process, because removal of postings by children and neighbors can
prevent notice from reaching the defendant.152
5. Default Judgments
Perhaps in part because of the last-minute and lower-standard notice
requirements for eviction proceedings, a high number of defendants do not
appear on their scheduled court dates.153 Civil procedure rules allow cases
to be decided against tenants in their absence; the courts in those cases issue
default judgments.154 We lack full data on the subject, but the most recent
study indicates that, in the twenty largest cities in the country, 15 to 50
percent of eviction cases result in eviction by default.155 Other studies of
particular jurisdictions have found the default rate to be closer to 70 or 80
percent.156
These defaults are a significant part of how the courts function. Not
only is the proportion of eviction cases resolved through default relatively
high but, moreover, the issuance of default judgments—which require no
merits hearing at all—allows each judge to process hundreds of eviction
149. See LSC Eviction Laws Database, supra note 81; see, e.g., JOAN BRANNON, NORTH CARSMALL CLAIMS LAW 149–50 (2009) (comparing North Carolina’s service of process requirements for eviction and those in suits for small sums of money).
150. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
151. See Park, supra note 68 (describing how innovations in property law reflect agendas of
racial capitalism).
152. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 454–55 (1982).
153. See Judith Fox, The High Cost of Eviction: Struggling to Contain a Growing Problem, 41
MITCHELL HAMLINE J. OF PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. 167, 191 (2020) (“Whenever I ask a tenant why he
or she failed to appear at their eviction hearing, I get one of two answers: (1) I did not know about
it, or (2) it would not matter because everyone gets evicted.”).
154. Civil Procedure Rule 55 governs default judgments, while Rule 54 governs judgments in
general.
155. See David Hoffman & Anton Strezhnev, Evicted by Default (data table on file with
author).
156. See Evictions in the Courts, KANSAS CITY EVICTION PROJECT 1, 2 (Jan. 24, 2018), https://
static1.squarespace.com/static/59ba0bd359cc68f015b7ff8a/t/5a68e811e4966bee3fb5d6cd/
1516824594549/KC+Eviction+Project+-+Courts+Analysis.pdf (70% default rate in Jackson
County, Missouri); WILLIAM E. MORRIS INST. FOR JUSTICE, INJUSTICE IN NO TIME: THE EXPERIENCE OF TENANTS IN MARICOPA COUNTY JUSTICE COURTS 1, 8 n.22 (2005), https://morrisinstitute
forjustice.org/helpful-information/landlord-and-tenant/4-final-eviction-report/file (80% default
rate in Mariscopa County, Arizona).
OLINA
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cases in a single morning. The smooth functioning of eviction court dockets
depends on disposing of many tenants’ homes through default.
6. Limits on Defenses and Counterclaims
When tenants do appear, the defenses and counterclaims they raise are
typically restricted by statute. State laws formally circumscribe the defenses
that tenants may raise. For example, although every state in the nation (except Arkansas) requires landlords of residential property to provide premises fit for human habitation, and a breach of that duty entitles a tenant to a
rent abatement,157 a number of states explicitly forbid the defense of the
warranty of habitability in eviction cases. They instead require tenants to
raise the claim affirmatively in a separate suit. In Lindsey v. Normet, the
same case in which the U.S. Supreme Court deemed eviction cases too simple to require more than six days’ notice,158 the Court also approved this
limitation on eviction courts’ jurisdiction.159 There the majority ruled that
Oregon could forbid eviction courts’ consideration of all issues other than
whether rent was paid.160
7. Rent Bonds
Even in those states that permit eviction courts to hear additional defenses, many statutes nonetheless require the tenant to pay a rent bond to
the court, on behalf of the landlord, as a condition of asserting them.161 If a
tenant cannot pay the rent bond on time, the tenant automatically loses all
rights to the home, although the court has not ruled on the merits of the
case. Rent bond statutes vary widely from state to state, and some apply at
the first appearance, while others apply only to postponements or appeals.162 Florida, for example, is among the most drastic: It requires payment of a rent bond to raise any defenses at all. Failure to pay the bond “is
deemed an absolute waiver of the tenant’s defenses and entitles the landlord
to an immediate default for possession without further notice or hearing.”163
In North Carolina, tenants must pay the rent bond to remain in the home
during the appeal from small claims court (where the magistrate judges are
not lawyers).164 Even in those states that do not require payment of a rent
157. Sabbeth, supra note 44, at 121–22.
158. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); supra notes 137–140 and accompanying text
(describing Lindsey).
159. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 64–65.
160. Id.
161. See LSC Eviction Laws Database, supra note 81; Rent Bond Data by State Chart, on file
with author.
162. See LSC Eviction Laws Database, supra note 81; Rent Bond Data by State Chart, on file
with author.
163. F.S.A. § 83.232(2)(b)(5) (1995).
164. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-34(b) (2019) (describing rent bonds); see infra note 174 and accompanying text (highlighting absence of legally trained judges).
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bond upfront, almost all require ongoing payments of rent to maintain
posssession of the home during the case.165 For tenants who are paying the
majority of their incomes toward their rent,166 the rent bond requirement
can foreclose the opportunity to raise defenses at all.
8. Laws Governing Legal Services
The ability to articulate defenses and counterclaims depends on some
familiarity with the guiding legal principles, which most tenants lack.167
Yet the governing law in most jurisdictions provides lawyers only to those
parties who can afford to pay them.168 As a result, roughly 90 to 97 percent
of tenants do not enjoy representation by counsel, in contrast to the 80 to 90
percent of landlords that do.169 This decreases tenants’ ability to identity
defenses, let alone present them in a way that courts will hear.170
The underrepresentation of tenants and overrepresentation of landlords
not only determines individual outcomes,171 but also it influences the culture and development of the law of eviction courts.172 Importantly, tenants
and landlords are not only differently situated with respect to representation
but also paired against one another in the adversary system, so that pro se
parties are regularly matched up against lawyers. As I have described in
165. See Rent Bond Data by State Chart, on file with author.
166. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., MILLIONS OF AMERICANS BURDENED
BY HOUSING COSTS IN 2015 (2015), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/son2017-housing-cost-burdenstable (showing percentage of households that are “severely cost-burdened,” which means they pay
more than 50 percent of their incomes toward rent).
167. See, e.g., Marisa Wojcik, Wisconsin’s Evictions Roller Coaster, PBS WISC. (Aug. 12,
2021), https://pbswisconsin.org/news-item/wisconsins-evictions-roller-coaster (“I ask them if they
have a legal defense and they’ll say, ‘Yes, I lost my job. I’ve lived here for two years and I’ve
always paid my rent and I lost my job. That’s why I haven’t been able.’ They think that’s a
perfectly valid defense and it’s certainly understandable,” explained Burke. “They’re very surprised when I tell them that that’s not.”).
168. See Sabbeth, Market-Based Law, supra note 128 (explaining how “an intersecting web of
regulation governs the market that distributes legal services . . . so that the more capital a party
has, the more service the party can use, while the majority of people have none”); NAT’L COAL.
FOR CIV. RIGHT TO COUNSEL, Status Map, http://civilrighttocounsel.org/map (showing jurisdictions that appoint eviction defense attorneys for tenants unable to purchase legal services in the
market); see also Sabbeth, supra note 5 (analyzing new right to eviction defense counsel).
169. Eviction Representation Statistics For Landlords and Tenants Absent Special Intervention, NAT’L COAL. FOR A CIV. RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2021), http://civilrighttocounsel.org/
uploaded_files/280/Landlord_and_tenant_eviction_rep_stats__NCCRC_.pdf.
170. See Sandefur, supra note 123, at 910; Bezdek, supra note 5, at 578–79 (describing silencing of tenants who attempt to raise defenses on their own).
171. See Dave DeNatale, Report: 93% Of Evictions in Cleveland Were Prevented During
First Six Months of Right to Counsel Program, WKYC (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.wkyc.com/
article/news/health/coronavirus/evictions-prevented-cleveland-right-to-counsel-program/95599c2644-9682-4387-a977-eef20d0769c2; Oksana Mironova, NYC Right to Counsel: First Year
Results and Potential for Expansion, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.cssny.org/
news/entry/nyc-right-to-counsel; Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon:
What Existing Data Reveal about When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 37,
46–48 (2010) (collecting earlier literature on same subject).
172. Sabbeth, supra note 5, at 78–79.
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prior work, such routine mismatching—specifically the systemic absence of
lawyers for particular classes of people in particular classes of cases, and
the presence of lawyers for others—over time, in the aggregate, distorts the
development of law in favor of those with representation and against those
without.173 While the statutory laws governing evictions in most parts of the
country are stingy with tenants’ rights, the underdevelopment, or distorted
development, of common law in the eviction courts also warps the doctrine.
9. Qualifications of Adjudicators
Individuals’ ability to raise defenses and the potential for law development are further limited because a suprising number of states do not require
judges to possess legal training. In at least seventeen states, judges may
hear eviction cases without having attended law school.174 Limited legal
training does not necessarily mean that a person cannot do good work, but
that depends what their work is. If the work of eviction courts is simply to
process claims for rent,175 legal training may be irrelevant. If, however, the
function of eviction courts is to interpret law—particularly complex, novel
law like that of the federal eviction moratoria—the adjudicators’ lack of
legal knowledge could be quite significant. Like the other features of eviction court design, the qualifications for judges suggest that the intended
function of eviction courts is not primarily to interpret and apply legal principles but something else.176
10. Obstacles to Appeals
While eviction cases are heard initially by adjudicators who are not
necessarily positioned to engage in sophisticated interpretations of law, the
possibility of taking up such interpretation on appeal encounters other obstacles.177 As noted above, in most states, tenants are required to pay a rent
bond as a condition of appealing, and this requirement is largely cost-prohibitive for the relevant class of people, as the majority are individuals who
173. See Sabbeth, supra note 44, at 135–36 (describing how the absence of counsel for tenants
stunts the development of doctrines of importance to them); Sabbeth & Steinberg, supra note 67
(describing how the absence of a right to counsel stymies law development); Sabbeth, supra note
5, at 88 (hypothesizing that the new right to counsel for tenants in NYC might influence the shape
of law development a field that had for decades been dominated by lawyers for landlords); Sabbeth, Market-Based Law, supra note 128 (describing how legal system that allots lawyers based
on ability to pay under develops poor people’s law).
174. See Sara Sternberg Greene & Kristen M. Renberg, Judging Without a J.D., 122 COLUM.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (on file with author) (manuscript at 51); see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-171.2 (2003) (defining qualifications required for magistrates); see also Alexandra Natapoff,
Criminal Municipal Courts, 134 HARV. L. REV. 964, 968 (2021) (critiquing criminal courts in
which judges are not lawyers).
175. See supra note 145.
176. See infra Part III (analyzing social function of eviction courts).
177. See Sabbeth, Market-Based Law, supra note 128 (noting that appeals courts disproportionately handle the claims of those with the resources to pursue them).
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struggle to pay their rent. Even if a tenant is able to pay the bond to appeal,
the courts with original jurisdiction over eviction cases are largely courts of
no record. That means there is no transcript, nor even so much as a sound
recorder, to commit to the public record what witnesses have said or what
documentary evidence was considered. Similarly, there is often no written
opinion to explain the judgment, beyond completion of the judgment form.
The absence of a fuller record opens the door for arbitrary decisions that
never receive scrutiny.
11. Eviction Court Design Summary
Even where law formally provides protections for tenants, those protections are often illusive because of the design features of eviction courts,
as described above. Empirical evidence shows that judges routinely disregard the law, to tenants’ disadvantage.178 Judges regularly issue judgments
for landlords without requiring them to establish their prima facie case,
even where the laws are clear that the landlord has the burden of proof.179
Frequently judges do not require landlords to support their arguments with
evidence of any kind, let alone admissible evidence.180 Whether due to unfamiliarity or hostility, judges do not apply tenants’ rights, even those
etched into the plain language of statutes.181 Evidence today suggests that
even if landlords are not represented, some judges still engage in these behaviors; representation by counsel makes a bigger difference for tenants
than for landlords.182 Even when tenants are represented, judges resist enforcing laws that protect tenants while nonetheless enforcing those that justify judgments for landlords.183 In this environment, it is not suprising that
tenants often waive the rights they possess.184
To be clear, this environment is not necessarily due to malevolence by
the social actors in the courts, but rather it reflects the legal architecture of
eviction. The procedural laws of eviction are designed to make eviction
quick and cheap, through relatively small filing fees,185 short timetables
between complaints and trials, and the minimal role of discovery and other
178. Sandefur, supra note 123, at 910–12 (collecting literature); Engler, supra note 171, at 47
(same); Sabbeth, supra note 5, at 79–80 (same).
179. Sabbeth, supra note 5, at 79.
180. Sabbeth, supra note 5, at 79.
181. Sabbeth, supra note 5, at 79.
182. Engler, supra note 171, at 81–82. This may be due to judges’ hostility, tenants’ relative
unfamiliarity with the process, or the racialized and gendered power relationship between landlords and tenants.
183. Summers, Good Law, supra note 5, at 149 (highlighting failure to apply warranty of
habitability).
184. See Summers, Civil Probation, supra note 5 (describing settlements that leave tenants
with fewer legal protections).
185. See supra Part II.A.1.
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more expensive features of ordinary civil litigation.186 Even before the pandemic, this approach to eviction litigation was inadequate for the faithful
interpretation of law—which can actually be an extremely complex web of
state and federal regulation187—but in the pandemic the problems became
more publicly visible.
B. Eviction Court Interrupted
The COVID-19 pandemic, and the eviction moratoria that it spurred,
created a partial interruption in the eviction court process. The Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act of 2020 provided the
first federal moratorium. The September 4, 2020 Order of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) and extensions of that order then
provided others. Additionally, federal agencies supplemented these authorities with their own regulations, and states and localities issued further legislation and executive orders. For purposes of this Article, I will focus on the
federal moratoria, and even those will be covered only in the most basic
terms. This Part will briefly describe certain provisions of the CARES Act
and the CDC Order and then turn to how the courts responded to these
interruptions in service.
1. CARES Act
The CARES Act was broad-sweeping legislation that approved significant expenditures to pump money into the economy, while offering protective regulation for a wide swath of industries and people. Among other
things, it included special protections for property owners so they would not
default on their mortgages.188 This included an option to request temporary
forbearance on loans, alongside a prohibition on the eviction of tenants living in the relevant property during such forbearance and for a limited time
thereafter, if the eviction was based on nonpayment of rent, fees, or penalties.189 This provision also prohibited charging any fees or penalties for late
payment of rent and required that a thirty-day notice to vacate be given
before requiring the tenant to vacate.190 The part of the CARES Act eviction protections that received the most attention, however, was a moratorium independent of the protections for property owners.
186. See supra Part II.A.1–10; see also Wilf-Townsend, supra note 145, at 1718–22 (describing the low costs for corporate plaintiffs who take advantage of the economies of scale in bringing
numerous similar lawsuits and of litigating against defendants who lack counsel or simply lose by
default for failure to appear).
187. See Spector, supra note 5 (arguing that substantive gains in tenants’ rights have been
unmatched and undermined by the law of procedure).
188. See CARES Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 9057 (2020) (forbearance of residential mortgage loan
payments for multifamily properties with federally backed loans).
189. Id. § 9057(d).
190. Id. § 9057(e).
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The CARES Act included a moratorium on all evictions from “covered
properties.”191 Coverage depended on whether the home was “on or in” a
property with a federally backed mortgage or other specific federal subsidies.192 The “covered properties” included approximately one-third to approximately 45 percent of rental properties in the United States.193 For 120
days, the CARES moratorium prohibited the “lessor of [a] covered dwelling” from “filing” any court action “to recover possession of the covered
dwelling from the tenant for nonpayment of rent or other fees or
charges.”194 For this same time period, the CARES Act forbid lessors of
covered properties from charging any fees or penalties associated with nonpayment.195 The legislation also imposed a new notice requirement,
whereby the lessor of a covered property was henceforth required to issue a
notice to vacate thirty days prior to requiring any tenant to vacate and prohibited from issuing such a notice until after expiration of the initial 120day period.196 The original 120-day period expired on July 24, 2020, and
the thirty-day notice requirement extended the protection to late August of
that year.
2. CDC Order
On September 4, 2020, the CDC issued its order halting evictions, the
Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of
COVID–19 (“the Order” or “the CDC Order”).197 Aside from specified exceptions, for the effective period,198 the Order provided as follows: A
191. Id. § 9058(a).
192. Id. § 9058(a).
193. Jeff Ernsthausen, Ellis Simani & Al Shaw, Can You Be Evicted During Coronavirus?
Here’s How to Find Out., PROPUBLICA (May 18, 2020, 11:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/
article/can-you-be-evicted-during-coronavirus-heres-how-to-find-out (providing database to look
up some, but not all, covered properties); Laurie Goodman, Karan Kaul & Michael Neal, The
CARES Act Eviction Moratorium Covers All Federally Financed Rentals—That’s One in Four US
Rental Units, URBAN WIRE (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/cares-act-evictionmoratorium-covers-all-federally-financed-rentals-thats-one-four-us-rental-units. The available
databases undercount the total number of covered units because they do not capture all subsidy
programs, leaving out the sizeable Low-Income Tax Credit program administered by the Treasury
Department and the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
194. 15 U.S.C.A. § 9058(b)(1) (2020).
195. Id. § 9058(b)(2).
196. Id. § 9058(c).
197. Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19, 85
Fed. Reg. 55292 (Sept. 4, 2020).
198. The Order ran until the end of December 2020. Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions
to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. at 55292, 55297. Subsequent orders
then extended its protections until the U.S. Supreme Court’s August 2021 decision in Alabama
Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2486 (2021). The subsequent
CDC orders adopted the language of the original, with very minor and relatively inconsequential
revisions. The final version added that a covered person must declare that they live in an area
“experiencing high or substantial levels of community transmission” of COVID-19. Temporary
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“landlord, owner . . . or other person with a legal right to pursue eviction
. . . shall not evict any covered person from any residential property.”199
The Order defined “evict” and “eviction” as “any action by a landlord . . . to
remove or cause the removal of a covered person from a residential
property.”200
To be covered, a person was required to provide to her landlord a
signed declaration attesting to five criteria.201 The last version of the Order
added a criterion related to whether the jurisdiction is facing high COVID19 rates, but that was not present earlier. The core five criteria were: (1)
meeting certain income limits; (2) an inability to make full rental payments
due to a loss of income or an extraordinary medical expense; (3) making
best efforts to obtain government rental assistance; (4) making best efforts
to make partial payments, taking into account other necessities; and (5)
eviction would render the person homeless or force them to relocate to
crowded quarters.202
The CDC Order differed from the CARES Act moratorium in several
ways, three of which I will mention here. First, the CDC Order applied
more broadly. It reached all types of housing, regardless of any connection
to a federally backed mortgage or federal subsidy.203 Instead of using property-specific criteria, the coverage of the CDC Order was dependent on the
Halt in Residential Evictions in Communities with Substantial or High Levels of Community
Transmission of COVID-19 to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19 (Aug. 3, 2021).
199. The Order including the following “Summary”:
Notice and Order; and subject to the limitations under ‘‘Applicability’’: Under 42 CFR
70.2, a landlord, owner of a residential property, or other person with a legal right to
pursue eviction or possessory action, shall not evict any covered person from any residential property in any jurisdiction to which this Order applies during the effective period of the Order.
Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19, 85 Fed.
Reg. at 55292, 55293.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. The full language defining a “covered person” was as follows: “Covered person” means
any tenant, lessee, or resident of a residential property who provides to their landlord, the owner
of the residential property, or other person with a legal right to pursue eviction or a possessory
action, a declaration under penalty of perjury indicating that: (1) the individual has used best
efforts to obtain all available government assistance for rent or housing; (2) the individual [meets
certain income requirements]; (3) the individual is unable to pay the full rent or make a full
housing payment due to substantial loss of household income, loss of compensable hours of work
or wages, a lay-off, or extraordinary out-of-pocket medical expenses; (4) the individual is using
best efforts to make timely partial payments that are as close to the full payment as the individual’s circumstances may permit, taking into account other nondiscretionary expenses; and (5)
eviction would likely render the individual homeless—or force the individual to move into and
live in close quarters in a new congregate or shared living setting—because the individual has no
other available housing options.. 85 Fed. Reg. 55292, 55293
203. The only original limit on place was jurisdictional. 85 Fed. Reg. 55292, 55293 (“This
Order does not apply in any State, local, territorial, or tribal area with a moratorium on residential
evictions that provides the same or greater level of public-health protection than the requirements
listed in this Order.”).
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circumstances of the “person” claiming its protections.204 Because the goal
of the CDC was to stop the spread of communicable disease,205 and the
virus spread through neighborhoods and across state lines without recognizing distinctions based on the financing of the properties where people live,
the CDC’s protection also applied regardless of the financial status of the
property.
Second, unlike the CARES Act, the CDC Order did not stop or slow
the duty to pay rent or fees.206 It did not stop or slow landlords from collecting rent, making reports to credit agencies, nor even initiating small claims
or other collection actions to recover rent.207 This approach focused on the
CDC’s mission of protecting public health and left economic policy to other
government actors. Whereas the CARES Act sought to stabilize the pandemic economy, the CDC Order aimed specifically at slowing the spread of
disease. Directly regulating tenants’ financial obligations exceeded the
scope of this objective.
Third, following this different emphasis—protecting public health—
the types of eviction cases halted by the CDC were different than those
prohibited by the CARES Act. The CARES Act focused on economic issues and, accordingly, instituted a moratorium on evictions for nonpayment
of rent, whereas the CDC Order created a moratorium on a broader category
of eviction cases208 to prevent evictions of people whose displacement
would jeopardize health or safety.209
These differences in the goals behind the CDC Order and the CARES
Act have been largely glossed over by the courts and the public. Prominent
media outlets and government officials have spread the mistaken idea that
both the CARES Act and the CDC moratorium prohibited only nonpayment
cases, although, as will be discussed below, the plain language of the CDC
Order also prohibited evictions on the basis of lease expiration (known as
“holdovers”). This error may be due partly to misinterpreting the goals of
the CDC as economic, as opposed to focused on public health. But it is also
attributable to the common conception that rent payment is all that eviction
courts should address.210
204. Id. (defining “covered person”).
205. See id. (“Statement of Intent”).
206. Id. at 55294 (“This Order does not relieve any individual of any obligation to pay rent,
make a housing payment, or comply with any other obligation. . . . Nothing in this Order precludes the charging or collecting of fees, penalties, or interest as a result of the failure to pay rent
or other housing payment on a timely basis.”).
207. Id.
208. See infra Part II.B.3.b (describing applicability of the Order).
209. 85 Fed. Reg. 55292, 55293-96 (describing goals of the Order).
210. See supra notes 137, 139, 159 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ perception of
eviction cases as simple proceedings focused solely on nonpayment of rent and statutory restrictions that prohibit eviction judges from considering other issues). To be clear, the vast majority of
eviction proceedings are based on allegations of nonpayment of rent; that is correct. But my point
is that there is a common perception of eviction courts as primarily rent collections agencies,
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3. Court Response
The eviction moratoria contained in the CARES Act and the CDC Order did prevent enormous numbers of evictions that would otherwise have
occurred.211 They also failed to prevent many others.212 Those failures result in part from the design of eviction courts.213 Eviction courts are not
fertile ground for the flourishing of legal interpretation, let alone a place for
carefully teasing out the subtleties of novel regulations. That is both a cause
of and a result of our societal hostility to centering tenants’ rights and our
expectation of privileging owners’ entitlements.214 This approach is visible
in the design of eviction courts215 and is the product of the system thus
designed.
The values animating that system also found expression in other fora.
The National Association of Realtors and their supporters launched multiple
lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of eviction moratoria.216 Setting
aside the debate as to the scope of the CDC’s regulatory authority, the many
constitutional attacks on the CDC Order reflect something else: a deeper
discomfort with the social priorities recognized in the Order.217 The moratoria unsettled expectations because, as the U.S. Supreme Court explained
in Alabama Association of Realtors, the potential profit of the property
rather than civil courts designed to apply and interpret law, and this may have contributed to the
cramped interpretation of the CDC Order. See infra Part II.B.3.b (describing interpretation of the
CDC Order); Part III (analyzing function of eviction courts).
211. See Rangel, Hasa, Lemmerman, Rish & Hepburn, supra note 19; see also Leifheit, Linton, Raifman, Schwartz, Benfer, Zimmerman & Pollack, supra note 96, at 2568; Kay Jowers,
Christopher Timmins, Nrupen Bhavsar, Qihui Hu & Julia Marshall, Housing Precarity & The
Covid-19 Pandemic: Impacts of Utility Disconnection And Eviction Moratoria On Infections And
Deaths Across Us Counties 4–5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 28394, 2021).
212. See sources supra note 20.
213. See supra Part II.A (describing eviction courts’ design features). Another reason involuntary relocations continued in spite of the moratoria was that large numbers of landlords circumvented the courts and instituted informal, or extralegal, evictions. See also supra note 25 (noting
prevalence of informal evictions before the pandemic).
214. See supra notes 64, 76–79 and accompanying text; infra notes 268–271 and accompanying text.
215. See supra Part II.A.
216. Ron Lieber, Realtors Want to Sell You a Home. Their Trade Group Backs Evicting
Others., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/17/your-money/realtorspandemic-eviction-ban.html?smid=TW-share; Andrew Perez & David Sirota, Charles Koch
Funded Eviction Push While Investing in Real Estate Companies, GUARDIAN (May 21, 2021,
12:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/may/21/charles-koch-foundation-evic
tion-real-estate?utm_term=Autofeed&CMP=twt_b-gdnnews&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=
Twitter#Echobox=1621617438.
217. See Laurence H. Tribe, Protecting Public Health from Judicial Arrogance, BOS. GLOBE
(Aug. 6, 2021, 4:41 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/08/06/opinion/protecting-publichealth-judicial-arrogance; Peter M. Shane, No, the CDC Eviction Moratorium Does Not Raise
Constitutional Issues, WASH. MONTHLY (Aug. 10, 2021), https://washingtonmonthly.com/2021/
08/10/no-the-cdc-eviction-moratorium-does-not-raise-constitutional-issues/#.YRL_vhRI3l4.twit
ter; see also Jack Goldsmith, The Anatomy of a Screw Up: The Biden Eviction Moratorium Saga,
LAWFARE BLOG (Aug. 9, 2021, 9:43 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/anatomy-screw-bideneviction-moratorium-saga.

R
R

R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\18-2\UST206.txt

390

unknown

Seq: 32

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

22-JUL-22

13:51

[Vol. 18:2

owners was recognized as worthy of fierce protection.218 Indeed, the owners’ right to profit ultimately mattered more to the Court than the human
lives at stake.219
But, even before the Supreme Court put its foot down firmly on the
side of the owners and brought the CDC moratorium to a screeching halt,
the lowly eviction courts were where the rubber met the road. And here the
courts’ design features—the mismatch of representation for the parties, the
absence of time expected to be allotted to each case, the lack of discovery in
many jurisdictions, along with other aspects discussed above—together
weakened the power of the moratoria.
a. CARES Act Interpretation
As might be expected, the new federal legislation and orders required
some interpretation. As one example, the CARES Act’s eviction moratorium turned on the issue of whether the tenant’s home was a “covered
dwelling.” The legal complexity is apparent from the Act’s lengthy definitions, which include as one of several criteria for “covered dwelling” that it
is “on or in a covered property,” while “covered property” is then defined
by reference to citations for two unrelated statutory provisions (the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and the Housing Act of 1949), as well as
the use of the terms “federally backed mortgage loan” and “federally
backed multifamily mortgage loan,” each of which is then defined in later
sections that themselves have two subparts each.220 It is doubtful that a
218. See Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489
(2021).
219. Id. at 2489.
220. The full definition section is as follows.
SEC. 4024. TEMPORARY MORATORIUM ON EVICTION FILINGS.
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
COVERED DWELLING.—The term ‘‘covered dwelling’’ means a dwelling that—
(A) is occupied by a tenant—pursuant to a residential lease; or without a lease or with a lease
terminable under State law; and
(B) is on or in a covered property.
COVERED PROPERTY.—The term ‘‘covered property’’ means any property that—
participates in—
a covered housing program (as defined in section 41411(a) of the Violence Against Women Act of
1994 (34 U.S.C. 12 12491(a))); or the rural housing voucher program under section 542 of the
Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S.C. 1490r); or has a—Federally backed mortgage loan; or
Federally backed multifamily mortgage loan.
DWELLING.—The term ‘‘dwelling’’—
(A) has the meaning given the term in section 802 of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3602); and
(B) includes houses and dwellings described in section 803(b) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 3603(b)).
FEDERALLY BACKED MORTGAGE LOAN.—The term ‘‘Federally backed mortgage loan’’
includes any loan (other than temporary financing such as a construction loan) that—
(A) is secured by a first or subordinate lien on residential real property (including individual units
of condominiums and cooperatives) designed principally for the occupancy of from 1 to 4 families, including any such secured loan, the proceeds of which are used to prepay or pay off an
existing loan secured by the same property; and
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tenant without an attorney could make sense of this language, if she knew
where to find it.
Even if a tenant were one of the roughly 3 percent who did have a
lawyer, and even if that lawyer understood the intricacies of the federal
subsidies and mortgage arrangements sufficiently to apply the relevant provision, assessing the relevant facts was still an uphill battle, because, as
noted earlier, eviction courts restrict discovery.221 CARES Act protections
for the tenant depended on the property’s subsidy arrangements, tax status,
and mortgage agreements, but the landlord controlled all the relevant information. Without discovery, how could the tenant know, let alone prove, that
the property was covered?
In North Carolina, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court ultimately
required that landlords file and serve a form affidavit providing certain information about the property’s coverage status and dictated that courts were
not to order evictions absent a finding that the relevant property was not
covered by the CARES Act,222 but North Carolina was an outlier. Further,
anecdotal evidence indicates that judges granted evictions to landlords who
failed to complete the affidavits or to provide any evidence to support such
a finding.223 This matches prior empirical evidence demonstrating that, routinely in eviction courts, landlords’ bald allegations suffice to achieve out(B) is made in whole or in part, or insured, guaranteed, supplemented, or assisted in any way, by
any officer or agency of the Federal Government or under or in connection with a housing or
urban development program administered by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development or
a housing or related program administered by any other such officer or agency, or is purchased or
securitized by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or the Federal National Mortgage
Association.
FEDERALLY BACKED MULTIFAMILY MORTGAGE LOAN.—The term ‘‘Federally backed
multifamily mortgage loan’’ includes any loan (other than temporary financing such as a construction loan) that—
(A) is secured by a first or subordinate lien on residential multifamily real property designed
principally for the occupancy of 5 or more families, including any such secured loan, the proceeds
of which are used to prepay or pay off an existing loan secured by the same property; and
(B) is made in whole or in part, or insured, guaranteed, supplemented, or assisted in any way, by
any officer or agency of the Federal Government or under or in connection with a housing or
urban development program administered by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development or
a housing or related program administered by any other such officer or agency, or is purchased or
securitized by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or the Federal National Mortgage
Association.
221. See supra Part II.A.3.
222. Emergency Directive 18, Order of Chief Justice, N.C. Supreme Court (May 30, 2020),
https://www.nccourts.gov/assets/news-uploads/30%20May%202020%207A-39%28b%29%282
%29%20Order.pdf?v6tK3XJVqgOY0Ps80nAcS6s5ghD2XLeU.
223. Legal Aid attorneys reported to me that judges seemed unfamiliar with the requirement
of making such a “finding,” and instead judges regularly handed landlords the form affidavit to
complete at the time of hearing before the court issued judgment in their favor. See also NAT’L
HOUS. L. PROJECT, STOPPING COVID-19 EVICTION SURVEY RESULTS (2020) (reporting that landlords “falsely certified that their properties were not covered by moratoria”), https://
www.nhlp.org/wp-content/uploads/Evictions-Survey-Results-2020.pdf.
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comes in their favor.224 With respect to coverage under the CARES Act,
there was little interest in testing landlords’ assertions, such as by demanding judicial review of the underlying documents, let alone disclosure of
such documents to tenants through a discovery process.
The coverage issue in the CARES Act is just one example of a set of
complex questions that tenants were unequipped to answer, while landlords
controlled the relevant information, and judges often appeared unconcerned
with getting to the truth.
Even with its complexity, the CARES Act moratorium was far simpler, as a matter of law and fact, than the moratorium of the CDC Order.
b. CDC Order Interpretation
As others have documented, landlords have found loophole after loophole through the CDC moratorium.225 But there is also a more basic problem: Judges have openly rejected it. Even where landlords have not raised
challenges, some lower court judges have taken it upon themselves sua
sponte to refuse to apply the moratorium on the basis that it conflicts with
their understanding of constitutional values.226
Equally revealing is the distortion of the plain language and clear intent of the regulation. One “loophole” that has been repeatedly observed is
landlords who respond to tenants behind on rent by refusing to renew the
tenants’ leases. The landlords then file for eviction on the basis of the lease
expiration and the absence of any renewal. Instead of alleging that the tenant failed to pay rent, the landlord claims that the tenant was “holding over”
after the tenancy ended. The landlord then asserts that the CDC Order did
not apply because the case was not one based on nonpayment.
Landlords have had ample opportunity to take this approach. Given
that millions of tenants across the country are on month-to-month leases,
leases expire frequently, making refusing to renew an easy option. Even
tenants who once had annual leases have likely watched those annual lease
periods expire since the pandemic arrived in the United States in the spring
of 2020, and their landlords, too, have refused to renew the leases with
tenants who have struggled to pay. While precise data is not available, reports indicate that landlords have done just that—refused to renew leases

224. See Sandefur, supra note 123, at 925 (collecting literature). Cf. Chrysafis v. Marks, 141
S. Ct. 2482, 2482 (2021) (ruling that New York eviction moratorium “precluded a landlord from
contesting [tenant’s financial hardship] certification and . . .[therefore] violate[d] the Court’s longstanding teaching that ordinarily ‘no man can be a judge in his own case’ consistent with the Due
Process Clause.”).
225. Stern & Bryant, supra note 20.
226. Kimble, supra note 120.
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and then filed eviction actions, naming them as holdovers when they are
based on nonpayment.227
Courts have accepted these claims and issued judgments for eviction
for various reasons. Some judges never learned the underlying facts and
true reason for the cases. Others followed the logic of the legal “loophole,”
refusing to recognize the CDC Order’s applicability beyond nonpayment
actions. But it is actually somewhat inaccurate to portray this as a loophole:
this is a direct violation of the regulation’s plain language.
The CDC Order states that landlords may not evict “subject to the
applicability section below,” and that applicability section contains five
enumerated exceptions.228 The Order’s “Applicability” section states in
full:
This Order does not apply in any state, local, territorial, or
tribal area with a moratorium on residential evictions that provides the same or greater level of public-health protection than
the requirements listed in this Order. In accordance with 42
U.S.C. 264(e), this Order does not preclude state, local, territorial,
and tribal authorities from imposing additional requirements that
provide greater public-health protection and are more restrictive
than the requirements in this Order.
This Order is a temporary eviction moratorium to prevent the
further spread of COVID–19. This Order does not relieve any
individual of any obligation to pay rent, make a housing payment,
or comply with any other obligation that the individual may have
under a tenancy, lease, or similar contract. Nothing in this Order
precludes the charging or collecting of fees, penalties, or interest
as a result of the failure to pay rent or other housing payment on a
timely basis, under the terms of any applicable contract.
Nothing in this Order precludes evictions based on a tenant,
lessee, or resident: (1) Engaging in criminal activity while on the
premises; (2) threatening the health or safety of other residents;
(3) damaging or posing an immediate and significant risk of damage to property; (4) violating any applicable building code, health
ordinance, or similar regulation relating to health and safety; or
(5) violating any other contractual obligation, other than the
timely payment of rent or similar housing-related payment (including non-payment or late payment of fees, penalties, or
interest).229
227. See, e.g., Yanqi Xu, As Landlords Find Loopholes to Evict Tenants, A Concurrent Push
for Gentrification in Communities of Color, N.C. POL’Y WATCH (Apr. 19, 2021), https://ncpolicy
watch.com/2021/04/19/as-landlords-find-loopholes-to-evict-tenants-a-concurrent-push-for-gentrifi
cation-in-communities-of-color.
228. Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19, 85
Fed. Reg. 55292, 55294 (Sept. 4, 2020).
229. Id.
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All five exceptions involve the tenant breaching the lease (in a way
unrelated to nonpayment) or threatening public safety.
Notably, expiration of a lease is not listed as an exception to the applicability of the CDC Order.230 This fits with the goals of the CDC as an
agency focused on promoting public health by preventing displacement and
homelessness during a pandemic. The agency had to allow some exceptions, such as for landlords to remove persons who posed dangers to others.
And it is not surprising that the CDC also in the fifth exception shows
deference to the landlord’s property rights if the tenant in any way fails to
meet obligations other than paying rent. But the main goal is to prevent the
displacement of people whose presence in public spaces is seen as a health
threat to themselves and others, unless some countervailing reason justifies
the risk to public health. People whose leases have expired do not provide
such countervailing reasons. The text of the CDC Order did not limit its
protections to nonpayment cases, and it did not identify lease expiration
holdovers as exceptions.
Yet courts across the country acted as if it did.231 To include lease
expiration cases or holdovers in the moratorium struck some as encroachment on the freedom of contract, on the theory that it forced landlords to
extend contracts when they might prefer not to do so. A reasonable interpretation of the Order, which avoids this potential constitutional conflict, however, is that the Order did not require landlords or tenants to renew or
extend leases though it did temporarily limit the remedies available when
the lease expired: For the relevant period, the tenant could not be forced to
vacate if the moratorium covered the person. But this distinction did not
carry the day.
Ultimately, the CDC followed the original Order with issuance of a
“non-binding FAQ” document that suggested the Order was limited to nonpayment cases. Reversing course is not unusual in the face of political opposition, and some within the CDC may have believed that the agency had
unduly burdened landlords. The chronology of developments also suggests
that the CDC may have folded under the pressure of litigation. The agency
issued its new FAQ on the same day as it settled a particular case regarding
the Order’s constitutionality, and the stipulation of settlement lays out the
procedural history.232 In a conference call between the DOJ lawyers, the
230. Id.
231. See Joel Burgess, The Eviction Moratorium Still Stands, But New Loopholes Mean More
People Can Lose Housing, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN TIMES (July 5, 2021, 4:11 PM), https://
www.citizen-times.com/story/news/2021/07/05/nc-eviction-moratorium-extended-but-fewer-pro
tections/7841573002; Xu, supra note 227.
232. The FAQ were posted immediately after the CDC entered into a stipulation resolving
KBW Investment Properties v. Azar. The procedural history recited in the KBW stipulation lays it
out quite plainly. A DOJ attorney attempting to defend the constitutionality of the CDC Order
took a defensive position in a telephone conference, and the plaintiffs seized on that position and
exploited it. The stipulation then memorialized it, and the CDC then put out the FAQ the same day
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landlords’ lawyers, and the federal judge, the DOJ attorney apparently got
backed into the position that the CDC Order did not extend beyond nonpayment cases, and then that concession stuck.233 As a matter of administrative
law, an agency’s position taken in this defensive litigation posture ought not
to receive deference,234 but that well-settled principle lost relevance in this
context. Over time, the insistence that the CDC Order blocked only nonpayment actions allowed many landlords to circumvent the moratorium; they
refused to renew leases and filed eviction actions on the basis of holdover.
The pandemic’s interruption of eviction courts was never a complete
stop. The moratoria did not cover all cases, and the interpretations of them
broadened their exceptions beyond their language. Though the stream of
cases slowed significantly for a while, the eviction courts continued to operate throughout the pandemic. Their operations during this unusual period
reflect many of the same realities as their operations before and after.
III. REVISITING

THE

ROLE

OF

EVICTION COURTS

The snapshot of the eviction courts during the pandemic offers insights
into how well these courts are functioning and what they are functioning to
do. One might think that the eviction courts described in Part II.A—with
limited procedures and inadequate time to engage with law or ferret out
facts—are pure chaos,235 but arguably these courts are quite orderly in their
own way. They process hundreds of cases daily, like smooth machines,
with quick dispositions of large dockets.236 Perhaps eviction courts are not
dysfunctional but instead function quite well to meet certain social purposes; perhaps they function as designed.
This Part will argue that eviction courts serve a particular regulatory
function for a society in which contests between landlords and tenants over
property rights reflect longstanding political struggles over access to resources. Ultimately, the law of eviction courts serves to maintain the existing social order, one in which some people are denied access to housing
(as a place to live) while others profit from it.
as the stipulation. The CDC FAQ is undated on its face, and a screenshot of the CDC website (on
file with author) shows the date it was released.
233. Id.
234. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2417 (2019) (no deference due to “convenient
litigating position” nor to post hoc rationalizations to defend an agency against attack).
235. See Emily A. Benfer, Antonia K. Fasanelli, Rasheedah Phillips & Kathryn Sabbeth,
Opinion: The Eviction Moratorium Limbo Laid Bare the System’s Extreme Dysfunction, WASH.
POST (Aug. 12, 2021, 9:15 AM) (hereinafter “Moratorium Limbo”), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/12/eviction-moratorium-court-cdc-congress (describing “structural dysfunction” of eviction courts”).
236. John Whitlow, Lawyer Calls Court an Eviction Machine, ALBUQUERQUE J. (July 9, 2019,
12:02 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1342272/lawyer-calls-court-an-eviction-machine.html.
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A. Kangaroo Courts
Do eviction courts serve legitimate purposes in adjudicating property
disputes in accordance with law, or are results virtually guaranteed?237 In
Kangaroo Courts, Shaun Ossei-Owusu reviews Alexandra Natapoff’s devastating critique of criminal municipal courts and, based on her description
of them, he asks whether such courts “could conceivably be understood as
kangaroo courts.”238 After his examination of the definition of the term, he
determines that the descriptor is an appropriate one for that forum. Using
the framework of his thoughtful analysis, although taking heed of his warning that “dropping the ‘k-bomb’ is no light matter,”239 it is hard to reach a
conclusion any different for eviction courts.
Professor Ossei-Owusu defines kangaroo courts as those that are “inferior, informal, and inequitable.”240 He explains these criteria as follows:
The inferiority of kangaroo courts refers to the issue of structure and quality. These courts are considered to be structurally
subordinate to traditional courts and likely to generate substandard adjudicative outcomes.
The informal nature of kangaroo courts refers to the fact that
they sometimes operate unofficially (that is, outside the purview
of the traditional legal system) or in a manner that is quite casual
(that is, with less intention or deliberation).
Finally, and relatedly, kangaroo courts are inequitable. Their
reduced procedural protections and generally degraded nature
lead to strong likelihoods that they produce unfair legal
decisions.241
The ways in which eviction courts meet these standards as inferior,
informal, and inequitable may be obvious from the earlier description of
eviction courts’ basic design features,242 but a brief refresher could be
helpful.
We begin with inferiority. Eviction courts are “structurally subordinate
to traditional courts,” and they are not only “likely to generate substandard
adjudicative outcomes” but have been proven empirically to do so. In the
eviction courts, as a result of the lower notice requirements, restrictions on
consideration of defenses, scarcity of discovery processes, and distortions
created by the systemic mismatching of unrepresented individuals against
attorneys, the outcomes are anything but likely to be accurate reflections of
237. One might also argue that the two are not mutually exclusive: if the laws are written to
subordinate, the application of law itself may lead to predetermined conclusions.
238. Ossei-Owusu, supra note 22, at 200.
239. Ossei-Owusu, supra note 22, at 201 (quoting Parker B. Potter Jr., Dropping the K-Bomb:
A Compendium of Kangaroo Tales from American Judicial Opinions, 11 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL &
APP. ADVOC. 9, 9 (2006)).
240. Ossei-Owusu, supra note 22, at 202.
241. Ossei-Owusu, supra note 22, at 202 (emphasis in original).
242. See supra Part II.A.
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the application of governing law to true facts. Indeed, the eviction courts
share particular features of inferiority with the criminal municipal courts.
The judges are not guaranteed to be lawyers. The courts are not courts of
record, and the courts are largely shielded from appellate scrutiny and so
judges can continually misapply the law.243
The informality of eviction courts is a bit more ambiguous, because
there are certain formalities that judges maintain.244 Judges have been
shown to punish tenants for failing to understand or apply formal rules.245
And eviction courts regularly issue default judgments, swiftly deciding the
cases based on the tenants’ technical failures.246 Yet, when dealing with
landlords’ evidentiary burdens, judges are regularly quite “casual . . . with
less intention or deliberation.” Moreover, Professor Ossei-Owusu’s definition from West’s Encyclopedia of American Law is spot on: courts are
“guided less by concern for justice than by the desire to wrap up as many
trials as the day allowed.”247 The statutory prohibitions on the raising of
defenses and counterclaims, the shortened timeframe between the complaint
and trial, and the limits on discovery, all suggest a “jurisprudential ‘embrace of informality.’”248
While the informality of eviction courts does bring them closer to Professor Ossei-Owusu’s kangaroo court model, it is worth recognizing that at
various points in history advocates have introduced informal procedures as
a way of making courts more democratic and accessible to people not wellserved by a formal, adversary process.249 Juvenile courts, for example, were
initially introduced as an informal alternative to criminal courts, to better
serve children’s needs.250 Advocates ultimately concluded, however, that
the potential for arbitrariness allowed for abuse, and they traded discretion
for due process rights.251 When the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a right
to counsel for juveniles, it explicitly rejected what it viewed as the “kangaroo court” to which children had been subjected.252
243. Ossei-Owusu, supra note 22, at 208.
244. See Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. L.
REV. 741, 802–03 (2015).
245. Bezdek, supra note 5, at 572–89; see also Anna Carpenter et al., Judges in Lawyerless
Courts (forthcoming 2022) (examining “informal” domestic violence courts in which judges fail
to explain, and take pro se parties to task for failing to understand, formalities of law).
246. Hoffman, supra note 155. But see Sudeall & Pasciutti, supra note 5, at 1384 (observing
rural courts in which judges attempted to schedule hearings when both parties could appear).
247. Ossei-Owusu, supra note 22, at 103 (quoting 6 WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
LAW 103 (Jeffrey Lehman & Shirelle Phelps eds., 2d ed. 2005)).
248. Ossei-Owusu, supra note 22, at 209 (quoting Alexandra Natapoff, Criminal Municipal
Courts, 134 HARV. L. REV. 964, 1014 (2021)).
249. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 1
(1982) (analyzing the opportunities and limitations of informal justice systems).
250. Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in
Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 777–81 (2010).
251. Id. at 779.
252. Id. at 780 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967)).
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Today, many access to justice advocates favor simplifying the courts,
given the number of pro se litigants unable to navigate them.253 As I have
argued elsewhere, streamlining processes might increase speed and decrease costs, but neither of those is guaranteed to serve the interests of the
individuals before the courts.254 In fact, were evictions slower and more
expensive for landlords to pursue, perhaps they would be less frequent.255
Moreover, prioritizing fast and cheap processes risks substantive losses.256
Even if individual case outcomes were demonstrated to be accurate in a
streamlined process, it is worth considering whether courts in a democracy
ought to serve purposes beyond accurate resolution of individual disputes.257 If we believe our federal and appellate courts serve additional social functions, why should poor people’s courts be any different?258
Reasonable people may disagree about the tradeoffs of streamlined
procedures, but, returning to Professor Ossei-Owusu’s analysis of kangaroo
courts, eviction courts meet his third criterion: eviction courts are inequitable. “Their reduced procedural protections and generally degraded nature
lead to strong likelihoods that they produce unfair legal decisions.”259 As
Professor Ossei-Owusu notes, Jeff Stempel defines kangaroo courts as a
“‘forum in which either the outcome is largely shaped in advance because
of the bias of the decision-maker’ or . . . ‘in which the structure and operation of the forum result in an inferior brand of adjudication even if not
determined by intentional bias.”260 In precisely these ways, eviction courts
are inequitable.
Overt and implicit biases in favor of landlords might be part of the
story. Tenants are disproportionately poor women of color,261 while judges
253. See Sabbeth, Simplicity, supra note 128, at 287–88.
254. Sabbeth, Simplicity, supra note 128, at 289–300.
255. See ABDELHADI & AHMED, supra note 130, at 9 (“The convenience and affordability of
filing eviction cases has had the adverse effect of encouraging landlords to use eviction as a
standard rent collection tool.”).
256. See Sabbeth, Simplicity, supra note 128, at 294–95 (quoting Engler, supra note 171, at
76, 87).
257. See Sabbeth, Simplicity, supra note 128, at 301–02 (“The drive to simplify proceedings
and distill them to a one-size-fits-all approach suggests poverty law is static, or at least that it is
incapable of revision on behalf of the less powerful through litigation. . . . Simplification, with its
de-emphasis on law and reliance on unrepresented parties to serve themselves, leaves little room
for public interest law as an agent of change.”).
258. Sabbeth, Market-Based Law, supra note 128 (arguing that disinvestment in the courts
occupied disproportionately by poor women of color is a political choice that underdevelops the
law in areas of importance to them).
259. Ossei-Owusu, supra note 22, at 202.
260. Ossei-Owusu, supra note 22, at 204 (quoting Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations
from Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251, 256 (2007)).
261. Hepburn, Louis & Desmond, supra note 65, at 657–59; Deena Greenberg, Carl Gershenson & Matthew Desmond, Discrimination in Evictions: Empirical Evidence and Legal Challenges, 51 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 115, 120–21 (2016); Desmond, Urban Poverty, supra note
25, at 102; Matthew Desmond, Poor Black Women Are Evicted at Alarming Rates, Setting Off a
Chain of Hardship, MACARTHUR FOUND. 1, 2 (2014), https://www.macfound.org/media/files/
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tend to be middle or upper-middle-class and are more likely white property
owners. The lawyers representing landlords are also more likely than the
tenants to be middle or upper-middle class white men, creating powerful
dynamics of race, gender, and class when they directly oppose tenants unrepresented by counsel.262
Even if judges were not biased, the architecture of eviction courts
heavily favors landlords and nearly ensures they will obtain swift judgments of possession.263 Even if informality could, in theory, operate to the
advantage of the individuals before it, the backdrop of inequity makes this
all but impossible. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that eviction courts
are indeed kangaroo courts whose results are largely predetermined.
B. Courts in Crisis
To understand the significance of the eviction courts’ operations, it is
helpful to reflect back on the substance of the issues these courts purportedly address: contests over access to homes. The pandemic brought increased attention to eviction courts because the threatened rise in displaced
families became an apparent threat to public health. While the emphasis on
the “eviction crisis”264 has been helpful in capturing the urgency and gravity of the situation, the narrative of this “crisis” could potentially obscure
the fact that housing resources and rights are and have long been contested.
The same year that Matthew Desmond published Evicted,265 by coincidence and without reference to Desmond’s work, David Madden and Peter
Marcuse published In Defense of Housing: The Politics of Crisis, where
they argued against the notion of a “housing crisis.”266 The terminology of
“crisis,” they explained, suggests that the system is currently broken and
needs a technical fix. In their view, however, this is not a time-specific
problem, and it does not call for technical policy solutions.
HHM_Research_Brief_-_Poor_Black_Women_Are_Evicted_at_Alarming_Rates.pdf; Bezdek,
supra note 5, at 535.
262. For more on judicial bias in favor of landlords, see Sabbeth, supra note 5, at 79.
263. See Sandefur, supra note 123, at 925 (collecting literature).
264. See Sophie Kasakove, With Cases Piling Up, an Eviction Crisis Unfolds Step by Step,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/07/us/evictions-crisis-us.html; Joe
Pinsker, The Coming Wave of Evictions is More than a Housing Crisis, THE ATL. (Sept 3, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2021/09/cdc-eviction-ban-housing-crisis/619960/; see
also Terry Gross, First-Ever Evictions Database Shows: ‘We’re in the Middle of A Housing Crisis’, NPR (Apr. 12, 2018, 1:07 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/12/601783346/first-ever-evic
tions-database-shows-were-in-the-middle-of-a-housing-crisis; Eve Claxton, Jon Hanrahan &
Katherine Simon, The Scarlet E: Unmasking America’s Eviction Crisis, WNYC (June 6, 2019),
https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/otm/scarlet-e-unmasking-americas-eviction-crisis; Virginia
Prescott & La’Raven Taylor, The New Scarlet Letter, E: NPR’s ‘On the Media’ Investigates
America’s Eviction Crisis, GEO. PUB. BROAD. (June 7, 2019), https://www.gpbnews.org/post/newscarlet-letter-e-nprs-media-investigates-americas-eviction-crisis.
265. DESMOND, supra note 2.
266. MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 60.
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First, the housing shortage is not a technical glitch in the system, but
rather it is a deep, complex social issue embedded in our political economy.
The challenges of homelessness are evidence of a global conflict over
whether housing is a home or is real estate. It is, they say, evidence of a
class struggle. Building on Madden and Marcuse’s critique, while folding in
race and gender, helps us to interpret the scene of eviction courts in the
pandemic and beyond.
These are sites of social struggle. The disputes of eviction court are
tensions between divergent societal values. Which should take priority: stabilizing shelter for tenants and their families,267 or, instead, maximizing the
profit of property owners?268
In the U.S. Supreme Court case that ultimately struck the death knell
for the CDC moratorium, the majority did so at least in part based on the
rather incredible conclusion that the balance of the “equities” required it to
prioritize profit over human life:
The equities do not justify depriving the applicants of the District
Court’s judgment in their favor. The moratorium has put the applicants, along with millions of landlords across the country, at
risk of irreparable harm by depriving them of rent payments with
no guarantee of eventual recovery.269
As Justice Breyer’s dissent pointed out, the owners claimed they were
waiting on “‘thousands of dollars’ in rental income,” which they were
likely to recoup due to Congressional allocation of 46.5 billion dollars, and
yet the majority determined that even a delay in collecting the rent outweighed the potential for massive spread of disease, which would likely
cause increases in illness and morbidity.270 The tenants’ capacity to live,
and the public health at large, were ranked second to the owners’ “fundamental” right to exclude.271
The second important aspect of Madden and Marcuse’s critique of the
“crisis” terminology is the reminder that none of this is a temporary circumstance. The housing crisis is not abnormal. It is not a bug but a feature. The
267. Matthew Desmond, Weihua An, Richelle Winkler & Thomas Ferriss, Evicting Children,
92 SOC. FORCES 303, 303–04 (2013).
268. The largest number of evictions are by the largest landlords conducting serial evictions.
In one Boston study, corporate landlords were shown to be two to three times more likely than
non-corporate landlords to file for evictions. Henry Gomory, The Social and Institutional Contexts
Underlying Landlords’ Eviction Practices, SOC. FORCES 1, 2 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/
soab063. In another, a small number of large landlords were found to be responsible for a significant percentage of all evictions in 17 cities. Devin Q. Rutan & Matthew Desmond, The Concentrated Geography of Eviction. 693 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 64, 65 (2021).
269. Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489
(2021) (emphasis added).
270. Id. at 2492 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 2489 (majority opinion) (“[P]reventing them from evicting tenants who breach their
leases intrudes on one of the most fundamental elements of property ownership—the right to
exclude.”).
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term “housing crisis” has been used for over a century.272 Throughout history, certain populations have struggled with inadequate access to safe and
stable housing. While Madden and Marcuse focus on the “working-class
and poor,” our history and present-day circumstances prod us also to see the
racialized and gendered dimension of how housing is distributed.
“Whose crisis?”273 As Destin Jenkins and Justin Leroy note in their
introduction to Histories of Racial Capitalism, “[T]he notion of a ‘crisis’
suggests that communities of color had not been trapped in cycles of debt
and dispossession long before 2008—in other words, a crisis for whom?”274
Madden and Marcuse assert that the “housing crisis” in the headlines in the
papers in 2016 reflected “the experiences of middle-class homeowners and
investors” following the 2008 market collapse.275 Today, the upheaval of
tenants, not only home-owners, has influenced investors and garnered
attention.
By providing an historical perspective on the COVID-19 pandemic,
Professor Witt offers us observations about public health that parallel these
insights about the housing market. Epidemics are extraordinary but they are
not unique in time. How a virus travels and how we respond reveals more
about our society than about the virus. Like the pandemic, the housing
shortage is socially constructed. How the courts respond to the shortage is
too.
C. What Do Eviction Courts Do?
Eviction courts operate in a social context where housing is a scarce
and unstable resource for subordinated people, and such scarcity generates
profit for those who benefit.276 Eviction courts do not merely operate
against this social backdrop; they help to create it.277 Multiple social factors
facilitate courts serving this role, and legal doctrine plays a significant
part.278
A traditional understanding of eviction courts is that landlords use
them to seize possession of real property, but recent empirical studies suggest that landlords initiate eviction proceedings to extract rental payments
and fees,279 sometimes with no intention of actually obtaining possession of
272. MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 60, at 9.
273. MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 60, at 9.
274. DESTIN JENKINS & JUSTIN LEROY, Introduction, in HISTORIES OF RACIAL CAPITALISM 1,
21 n.3 (2021).
275. MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 60, at 10.
276. See supra Part I.A (noting social construction of scarcity and profitable market
conditions).
277. See Brito, Sabbeth, Steinberg, & Sudeall, supra note 145 (describing how eviction courts
perpetuate and legitimize racial capitalism).
278. See supra Part I.B & II.A.
279. See, e.g., Sudeall & Pasciutti, supra note 5, at 1419–20.
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the property.280 Large corporate landlords in particular bring serial eviction
actions against the same tenants, over and over, as a model for collecting
rent and generating additional fees.281 In this way, the courts operate as a
device for routine asset collection282 and extraction of wealth.283
A small number of thinkers have suggested that landlords also use
eviction courts as a forum for tenant discipline.284 Landlords bring eviction
actions to instill fear and maintain control.285 This allows them to squeeze
tenants for amounts they may not owe, and it discourages tenants from
complaining about landlord misconduct ranging from violations of the warranty of habitability to sexual harassment.286
Building on these social scientists’ observations, in combination with
my analysis of eviction court design, I interpret eviction court operations as
bolstering and legitimizing the objectives of extracting wealth and imposing
control. More broadly, however, I would also suggest that eviction courts
enforce the existing social order, specifically the hierarchical relations between landlords and tenants.
Procedural doctrines like those described in this Article contribute to
this dynamic.287 The legal architecture of eviction courts leads these fora to
function at the level of “kangaroo courts”288 with outcomes all but predetermined. Those outcomes involve swift judgments for landlords and settlements that increase landlords’ control over tenants’ lives.289
280. Id.
281. Lillian Leung, Peter Hepburn & Matthew Desmond, Serial Eviction Filing: Civil Courts,
Property Management, and the Threat of Displacement, 100 SOC. FORCES 316, 337 (2020); Phillip
ME Garboden & Eva Rosen, Serial Filing: How Landlords Use the Threat of Eviction, 18 CITY &
CMTY 638, 656 (2019). See also Maya Abood, Wall Street Landlords Turn American Dream into
a Nightmare, PUB. ADVOCS. 5, 23 n.37 (2018), https://www.publicadvocates.org/wp-content/
uploads/wallstreetlandlordsfinalreport.pdf (referencing a Colony Starwood transcript of a 4th
Quarter earnings call in which one of the CEOs describes seeking every charge they “legitimately” can under the lease) (citing Fred Tuomi, Chief Executive Officer, Colony Starwood
Homes, Q4 2016 Results – Earnings Call (Feb. 28, 2017) (transcript available at https://seekingal
pha.com/article/4050611-colony-starwood-homes-sfr-ceo-fred-tuomi-on-q4-2016-results-earnings
-call-transcript)).
282. See Wilf-Townsend, supra note 145, at 1706.
283. See Brito, Sabbeth, Steinberg, & Sudeall, supra note 145 (manuscript at 30–33) (describing courts as legitimizing and enforcing extraction of wealth from communities of color and transferring seized assets to white corporations and the state).
284. See, e.g., Gomory, supra note 268, at 5.
285. See Summers, Civil Probation, supra note 5.
286. See Garboden & Rosen, supra note 281, at 640–41 (“The daily threat of eviction subjugates poor tenants, stripping them of their consumer rights. . . . Landlords understand that tenants
who are behind on their rent are less likely to advocate for their legal rights regarding housing
quality and code enforcement.”) (emphasis in original); Sabbeth, supra note 5, at 93–94, 104–06.
287. See supra Part II.A.
288. See supra Part III.A.
289. See Summers, Civil Probation, supra note 5 (describing frequent settlement agreements
that put tenants on probation, with behavioral rules that exceed the requirements of their leases
and build in harsher consequences for violations).
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Yet the evictions take on special significance because of the political
and economic context, which is the product of other laws.290 Eviction is a
terrifying possibility not only because involuntary displacement from one’s
home is a traumatic loss, but also because of the obstacles to finding a new
one.291 The fear that an eviction threat instills, and the control that those
who wield it can maintain, stems in part from the scarcity of safe, affordable housing in our society.292 That scarcity is the product of legal structures.293 Among the most important are the laws that promote housing as a
commodity for profit rather than treat it as shelter to be made available for
all who need it.294
CONCLUSION
Eviction courts purportedly resolve disputes over access to housing. In
a society in which unavailability of housing threatens a significant portion
of the population, one might ask if the courts are equipped to resolve this
fundamental social problem.295 Or, to approach it from another perspective,
if eviction courts determine, in Professor Witt’s words, “access to basic
needs,”296 the burdens of that social role ought to reshape the design of the
fora. If not, the courts serve simply to legitimize property owners’ use of
force.297
The pandemic has brought more of these tensions out in the open and
added strength to demands for something different. The social conditions
created by COVID-19 have encouraged elected officials to support activist
290. See supra Part I.B. Note also that under federal law an eviction can result in the loss of a
Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher; for tenants without stability of tenure because they live in
jurisdictions without just cause laws or rent regulation, the loss of that subsidy (which can be
transferred to another private property), may be an even scarier prospect than loss of the right to
occupy the current home.
291. See supra notes 56–59 (describing gap between incomes and housing costs); notes
60–65, 68–75 (referencing laws that create dearth of affordable housing, including laws excluding
people of color from wealth-building opportunities); Sabbeth, supra note 44, at 107 (identifying
additional obstacles of “segregation and discrimination, damaged credit, a criminal record, a prior
eviction, undocumented status and the absence of a social security number”).
292. See supra Part I.A.
293. See supra Part I.B.
294. See supra Part I.B.
295. See Colleen F. Shanahan & Anna E. Carpenter, Simplified Courts Can’t Solve Inequality,
148 DAEDALUS 128, 130 (Winter 2019) (“But are state civil courts the appropriate institution to
address individual socioeconomic needs . . . that manifest in a society with stagnant wages and
rising inequality?”).
296. WITT, supra note 7, at 129.
297. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 71–72 (1972) (describing summary judgment process as alternative to historical “self-help and violence”); Shirin Sinnar, Civil Procedure in the
Shadow of Violence, in A CRITICAL GUIDE TO CIVIL PROCEDURE (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript
at 5) (“Eviction procedures still operate in the shadow of violence, although it is now the state that
is solely authorized to inflict it.”); Sabbeth, Simplicity, supra note 128, at 297 (“If a landlord wins
an eviction case, an agent of the state will forcibly remove any tenant who remains in
possession. . .”).
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efforts that, ever so slightly, tilt the balance of power towards a more even
grade.298 Some ideas that were previously laughable are now on the
table.299
Law can be violent and oppressive, but it can also offer a buffer
against violence and oppression.300 While many landlords and judges may
view eviction courts as rent collection devices, or legitimate avenues for
removing families from the homes in which they live, that remains contested. Let the end of the eviction moratoria be a time to grapple seriously
with the social purposes our courts can and should serve, and then let us ask
ourselves what legal changes will move us in that direction.

298. See, e.g., Annie Nova, After Hard Times for Renters, Cities and States Pass Dozens of
New Protections, CNBC (Nov. 23, 2021, 10:45 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/23/after-ahard-time-for-renters-cities-and-states-pass-new-protections-.html; Jaboa Lake & Leni Tupper,
Eviction Record Expungement Can Remove Barriers to Stable Housing, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Sep. 30, 2021), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/eviction-record-expungement-can-re
move-barriers-stable-housing.
299. See, e.g., Rebecca C. Lewis, Good Cause Eviction Has Momentum Leading Into 2022,
CITY & STATE N.Y. (Dec. 7, 2021), https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2021/12/good-causeeviction-has-momentum-leading-2022/187324.
300. See, e.g., Sabbeth, Simplicity, supra note 128, at 299–300 (highlighting how procedural
doctrines can sometimes be the only tool protecting tenants from swift eviction).
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